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INTERVENTION OF RIGHT IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW INFORMAL FEDERAL
RULEMAKINGS
MichaelRay Harris*
The codification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
(the "FederalRules") created not only a more transactionalapproach
to litigation, but also the flexible party structure that was necessaryfor
"public law litigation" to flourish. Indeed, many argue that intervention
by non-parties in public law cases is essential to ensure that the court
can hear from and protect the wide range of interests likely to be
impacted by its decision. This Article seeks to make a case for limiting
intervention as of right in a specific subset of public law proceedingsthose brought to review the legality of informal federal rulemakings
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA " or the "Act").
The courts in these cases are placed in a difficult position in considering
applications to intervene. On one hand, given the narrow scope of
judicial review it is unclear how a court will benefit from the addition of
defendant-intervenorsseeking to uphold the administrative rule. Instead
the courtfaces the likelihood of information overload and/or information
degradation as defendant-intervenors incorporate duplicative or
irrelevant arguments into the proceedings. On the other hand, when a
court chooses to deny such intervention, it creates the possibility of a
lengthy appeal that will further delay judicial review. In sum,
intervention practice under the Federal Rules harms the rights of those
entitled to judicial review of an agency rulemaking and, most
importantly, negatively impacts the public as a whole by reducing the
efficiency of the administrativerulemakingprocess. As such, this Article
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Scholar's Forum at BYU Law. I express my deepest gratitude to all of those who commented on this
paper at those events. Your suggestions were invaluable, as was the diligent research and editing of
DU law students Jessica Morales, Tyler Geisert, and Mason Brown.
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argues that the practice is inconsistent with both the APA and the intent
of third-partypractice under the FederalRules.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Intervention-the procedural device enabling a third person to enter
and become a party to an existing court proceeding-is a comparatively
recent development in Anglo-American law.1 The codification of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules") in 1938 brought
recognition that a lawsuit is often not purely a private fight between two
litigants but can also have significant ramifications on the interests of
2
untold numbers of absentee persons. Accordingly, the drafters of the
new Federal Rules sought not only a more transactional approach to
litigation, but also to expand, where appropriate, participation by nonparties in federal court litigation.3
One consequence of a more flexible party structure under the
Federal Rules was the growth of "public law litigation" in the second
half of the twentieth century.4 As Professor Abram Chayes explained,
public law litigation seeks to address broad "grievance[s] about [the
content or context] of public policy."' 5 Because public law cases can have
pervasive impacts, "their adjudication often 'call[s] for adequate
representation in the proceedings of the range of interests that will be
affected by them.' 6 In this context, public law proponents have long

1. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901 (3d ed. 2007). See infra Part II.A for a discussion regarding the
history and growth of intervention procedure in the American federal courts.
2. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 1, § 1901; Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the
Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 263, 271 (1999).
3. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The EnvironmentalParadigm,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 240 (2000); infra Part II.A.1.
4. Appel, supra note 3, at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted); Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For a discussion regarding the relationship between intervention and public law
litigation, see generally Appel, supra note 3 and Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups,
PublicLaw Litigation, andFederalRule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 279 (1990).
5. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1302. Examples of public law litigation include Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1976) (involving police misconduct); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (holding public school segregation unconstitutional); Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp.
2d 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving prisoner rights); N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (concerning disability rights); and Perez v. Bos.
Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 1980) (addressing housing equality).
6. See Vreeland, supra note 4, at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting Chayes, supra note 4,
at 1310).
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asserted that a broad right to7 intervene is necessary to ensure that the
court hears all points of view.
In this Article, I do not quarrel over the role of intervention in
public law cases generally. Instead, I seek to make a case for limiting
intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules ("Rule
24(a)") in a specific subset of public law proceedings-those brought to
review the legality of informal federal agency rulemakings pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA" or the "Act"). 8 There are
important distinctions between the cases I am concerned with here and
the public law cases championed by Professor Chayes and others that
suggest courts should avoid making the same general assumptions about
the necessity for broad, multi-party representation on both sides of
informal rulemaking cases.
In any federal court case, an effective intervention rule must
balance the interests of the original parties in controlling the litigation,
the protection of third parties' interests that could be altered by the
outcome, and the interest of the court in the efficiency and accuracy of
the proceeding. 9 When dealing with public law litigation, a court must
consider these factors in the context of a proceeding with "sprawling
party structures, an emphasis on legislative factfinding, prospective
relief, ongoing decrees that affect widespread interests, and active
involvement by judges."' But in informal rulemaking cases, Congress

7. The need for intervention in public law cases is exemplified by affirmative action cases in
federal court. As one commentator explains:
Without intervention by beneficiaries, affirmative action cases typically pit
unsuccessful White applicants and counsel opposed to traditional civil rights
enforcement against governments and other institutions with a history of racial bias and
strong incentives to avoid confessing civil rights liability. None of those parties have an
unencumbered interest in identifying or preserving the constitutional and statutory
obligations of public institutions to halt, avoid, and remedy discrimination against people
of color; indeed, maintaining those obligations is contrary to the central interests of both
sides. Furthermore, each party in a bipolar affirmative action case faces strong
disincentives to presenting evidence of recent discrimination by the defendant or
questioning the validity of standardized tests and other selection criteria that may
discriminatorily exclude certain classes of applicants.
Yet those issues are at the core of litigation regarding the validity of affirmative
action policies.
Jenkins, supra note 2, at 268 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
8. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). I will assume that most readers of this Article have some
familiarity with judicial review of informal agency rulemaking under the APA. If not, see infra Part
III.A.2.
9. See John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join in:
Intervention Under FederalRule 24, 57 KY. L.J.
329, 329-30 (1969); see also Friends of Animals v. Kempthome, 452 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67-68 (D.D.C.
2006) (considering different interests in intervention).
10. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 280.
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has provided for an alternative forum to address many, if not all, of these
actualities associated with developing public policy." With regard to
party participation and legislative fact-finding, for instance, Congress
provided that the place for airing different points of view on the
appropriate scope of policy be not the courtroom, but rather in the
context of administrative rulemaking. 12
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the post-New Deal administrative
state is its outright rejection of the traditional adversarial model of
decision-making in which Congressional mandates and prohibitions
were enforced through private litigates in a court of law.' 3 The founders
of the modern American administrative state desired a system of
policymaking characterized by both expertise and flexibility to respond
to modem social and economic problems.14 The adoption of the APA in
1946 sought to offer the "prospect of achieving reasonable uniformity
the
administrative
process]
and
fairness
[throughout
without ... interfering

unduly with

the efficient

and

economical

operation of the" agency to respond to modem social and economic
problems.' 5 By passing the APA, Congress granted affected parties the
right to seek judicial review of agency decisions, but did so in a manner

l1. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., FormalRecords and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
39-41 (1975) (comparing the procedure of formal adjudication with the limited statutory
requirements for informal rulemaking as set forth in Section 551 of the APA).
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority, while often
criticized as unconstitutional, are a mainstay of the American lawmaking apparatus. See Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994). As
the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[s]o long as Congress 'shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."'
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
13. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 268 (1978).
14. Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way ofJudicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative
ProcessPrivilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 373 (2009); see also Michael Ray Harris,
Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency Policy Making Under a Necessity-Based
Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 282-83, 285 (2011).
15. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 224 (1945). Thus, since passage of the APA in 1946:
[t]he exercise of governmental power by administrative agencies is held in check by four
principal mechanisms: (1) structural constraints imposed under the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers; (2) statutory constraints set forth generally in the
Administrative Procedure Act and specifically in each agency's organic legislation; (3)
the requirement [as evidenced in Section 554 of the APA] that individuals be treated
fairly in conformity with the standards of procedural due process; and (4) the
institutional role of judicial review to assure agency adherence to applicable legal
standards.
E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV.
797, 797 (1992).
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intended to limit the role of the judiciary.' 6 The APA sets a very narrow
scope of review, with the court empowered only to review the
reasonableness of the agency's decision in light of the record compiled
by the agency through the rulemaking process.' 7 Thus, with a few
limited exceptions, there is no need for the parties to develop the
evidentiary record in the court, whether by producing documentary
evidence or presenting testimony from witnesses.' 8 Likewise, unlike in
other public law cases, the court is prohibited from taking an active role
in directing prospective relief.' 9
Many have already argued that judicial review of agency
rulemakings-while necessary to prevent administrative overreachinghas increased in scope well beyond that envisioned by the APA and, as a
result, has ossified the rulemaking process.20 Outside of constitutional
standing requirements,2 and occasional statutory time limitations,
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof.").
17. Id. § 706; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983).
18. It is black letter law that judicial review of informal rulemaking is to be based on the
administrative record that was developed during the rulemaking process. See Marshall J. Breger,
The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV. 337, 354 (1986); see also
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 192-204.
19. The APA expressly provides that the sole recourse in these cases is for a court to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be [among other
things] ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1573-74 (10th
Cir. 1994). "Informal agency action must be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural or
constitutional requirements or if it was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."' Id. (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 414 (1971)) (citation omitted) (intemal quotation marks omitted). For further discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 207-08.
20. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification
Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009) (acknowledging the contentions of
scholars that judicial review places burdens and uncertainty on agency policymaking and arguing
that the entire landscape of influence is much more nuanced than the simple picture of blame that
critics ofjudicial review draw).
21. The Cases and Controversies Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States will be a party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This clause limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the hearing of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 40:879

there are virtually no limits on the right to access the federal courts and
become a plaintiff to challenge an agency rule. The significant threat that
some affected party will seek judicial review has caused agencies to shy
away from rulemaking altogether, or take extra steps, for example,
"excessive data gathering, analysis, and long-winded explanations," to
bolster the chances and increase the likelihood that the rule will survive
the court process. 23 This, of course, "imposes unnecessary costs and
delays upon the agencies' regulatory programs. 2 4
Liberal intervention rules that provide a right to so-called
"defendant-intervenors" to participate in these actions can exacerbate the
problem of rulemaking ossification. In recent years, concern that the
government may choose to not defend, or will inadequately defend, its
own regulations 25 has led to an increase in motions to intervene on
behalf of the government agency. 26 When allowed, judicial review can
result in a courtroom full of both proponents and opponents to a
particular agency policy. In these cases, judicial review is often turned
into an unnecessary replication of the original rulemaking process.
Simply put, unless properly managed, intervention will further erode the
intended benefit of bureaucratic policymaking-rulemaking matters
should be primarily resolved through efficient administrative, not
adversarial, means.
Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of the development
of Rule 24(a) intervention and its use in public law litigation. As a
general matter, scholars and public interest lawyers have pushed for
cases that pose an actual controversy-that is, a dispute between adverse parties which is capable of
being resolved by the court. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence and its
interplay with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra Part II.B.I .c.
22. In many statutes, but not all, Congress has provided for a statute of limitations applicable
to the seeking ofjudicial review under the APA. See 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (2006) (providing that
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, a petition for review must be filed within
sixty days of agency action); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2006) (providing that under the Clean Water
Act, a petition for review of agency rulemaking must be filed within 120 days of promulgation); 42
U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (2006) (providing that under the Safe Drinking Water Act, a petition for review
must be filed within forty-five days of promulgation); id.§ 6976(a)(1) (providing that under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, a petition for review must be filed within ninety days of
promulgation); id § 7607(b)(1) (providing that under the Clean Air Act, a petition for review of an
agency rulemaking must be filed within sixty days from the appearance in the Federal Registrar of
the notice of promulgation); id.§ 9613(a) (providing that under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, a petition for review must be filed within ninety days of
promulgation).
23. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 393-95 (2000).
24. Id.at 395.
25. See infra Part V.C.
26. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss4/4

6

Harris: Intervention of Right in Judicial Proceedings to Review Informal

2012]

INTERVENTION OFRIGHT IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

expansion of intervention in public law cases, 27 including, in some
instances, judicial proceedings to review informal agency rulemakings.
Courts, however, have struggled over how to best articulate the
appropriate role of intervenors in these cases. Several courts have
substantially limited intervention by requiring the proposed intervenor to
demonstrate that an adverse decision in the case would impair "a direct,
significant and legally protectable interest,"2 9 despite the far more
generous language of Rule 24(a). 30 Other courts have gone even further
to impede intervention by applying presumptions that a government
defendant in an APA case can adequately represent the interests of
absentee parties 31 and others by requiring the intervenor to demonstrate
constitutional standing.3 2 The general focus of the courts on the technical
application of Rule 24(a) in public law cases has resulted in a failure of
the judiciary to examine the broader issue of whether intervention
impairs the administrative process in a manner inconsistent with the
APA and the Federal Rules.
Parts III and V contain the heart of my argument against
application of Rule 24(a) in informal rulemaking cases. Part III makes
the argument that intervention practice under Rule 24(a), as a practical
matter, affects the efficiency of administrative procedure, of which
judicial review is just a part. Motions to intervene, when contested, often
lead to significant delay in reaching the merits of the court's review of
agency action. Moreover, once admitted to the case, defendant27. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 3, at 279; Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 227, 288 (1990); Emma Coleman Jones, Problems and Prospects of Participation in
Affirmative Action Litigation: A Rolefor Intervenors, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.221, 223 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 3, at 237, 239, 310. Professor Appel takes a moderate
approach to intervention in public law cases, finding that courts should take steps to better ensure
that intervention benefits the litigation as opposed to allowing intervention for intervention's sake.
See id. at 217-18 (noting that in some cases "it is far from clear.. . how allowing intervention
assists the litigation" and suggesting that his proposed changes to intervention practice "not be taken
to mean that [he] oppose[s] intervention in public law cases"). He specifically advocates for use of
intervention in environmental litigation, including judicial review of environmental rulemakings. Id.
29. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) (involving a challenge of
legislation for which the proposed intervenor, an anti-abortion group, had lobbied for in the state
legislature).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a) allows intervention of right when a prospective
intervenor:
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984-85 (2d Cir.
1984).
32. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
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intervenors often provide the court with no useful additional information,
but instead attempt to side track the proceedings by enlarging the scope
of issues beyond the court's narrow scope of review.
Part IV argues that defendant-intervention in these cases is also
inconsistent with the Federal Rules. In seeking to increase participation
in federal court litigation, the primary concern of the drafters of the
Federal Rules focused on reducing the need for subsequent judicial
proceedings on issues already before the court.33 To do this, the Federal
Rules incorporated twin mechanisms: joinder3 4 and intervention.3 5 These
procedures were intended to ensure that one whose rights could be
affected by the outcome of a case, and thus might be in the position to
collaterally attack the court's judgment, has instead a means to
participate in the first instance-whether by being invited into the action
or demanding to be heard-in order to promote both fairness and judicial
efficiency.36
In a case of judicial review of informal rulemaking, however,
individual rights, while certainly impacted by the agency's rulemaking,
are, strictly speaking, not at issue when a court is reviewing agency
rulemaking. The APA provides that individual rights are to be
considered and of course balanced with the broader public interest in
regulatory planning by the agency during rulemaking.37 In an APA
proceeding, while a judge is in the position to make sure that the agency
considered all points of view, he or she is not in a position to consider
arguments outside the record or take remedial action to protect
defendant-intervenor rights. 38 Given the broader public interests at stake,
the limited judicial role, and the presence of alternative forums of
participation to address individual rights, the concerns embodied in
Rules 19 and 24 of the Federal Rules are not as strongly present in these
cases. Oddly, courts have acknowledged this proposition with regard to
joinder, 39 but have inexplicably expanded application of the counterpart
rule of intervention.
Finally, in Part V, I will propose amendments to the APA, the
Federal Rules, or both, in order to address non-party involvement in
33.

FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note.

34.

FED. R. CIV. P. 19.

35. FED. R. CIv. P. 24.
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note; FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory
committee's note.
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
38. Id. § 706; see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983).
39.

See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder,65 N.C.

L. REv. 745, 759 (1987).
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informal rulemaking cases. First, intervention as a matter of right under
Rule 24(a) should be eliminated. Second, limited permissive defendantintervention under Rule 24(b) should be allowed where: (a) a plaintiff
seeks a preliminary injunction and the court must consider non-record
evidence in considering the motion, or (b) the court has found the
agency's rule to be invalid and requests input on whether equity requires
vacature or remand of the rule. Finally, all settlements in informal
rulemaking cases should be subject to a judicial consent decree process
that allows for public comment regarding whether the settlement is in the
public interest.
II.

INTERVENTION, RULE 24, AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION

A.

Development of Intervention Procedurein the
American Legal System

1. Early Roots in Admiralty and Equity Proceedings
As Professor Peter A. Appel has observed, "[t]he exact origin of
intervention practice in the federal courts is somewhat unclear." 4 This
procedure was relatively unknown in early common law, 4' where a
42
plaintiff was granted complete control of his or her action.
Intervention, it has been said, "is the child of continental doctrines of

equity, '

43

developing in cases, for example, where a "fund" was

deposited into a court to which third parties could assert "a right that
would be lost absent intervention. '" 44 The in rem nature of these cases

required that courts accept the broadest possible representation of
interests. 45 Indeed, the decree of the court in these actions was "binding

40. Appel, supra note 3, at 241.
41. Seeid.at243-45.
42. See 2 J. CHITTY, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS 493-94 (1835). As
other scholars have observed, "[for the most part, the notion that third persons might invite
themselves into lawsuits between others ran counter to the Anglo-American notion that the plaintiff
was master of the suit." FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL

PROCEDURE 542 (4th ed. 1992).
43. Note, Intervention and the Meaning of "Bound" Under FederalRule 24(a)(2), 63 YALE
L.J. 408,408 n.5 (1954) [hereinafter Meaning of "Bound"].
44. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1967). In
addition to the fund cases, the early practice of intervention in federal court can be traced to in rein
admiralty cases. See, e.g., The Mary Anne, 16 F. Cas. 953, 954 (D. Me 1826) (No. 9195).
45. See George B. Fraser, Jr., Actions in Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29, 29 (1948) (explaining
that an action in rein is a "legal proceeding[] directed against property itself in order to reach and
dispose of the property or of some interest therein," which is premised on the idea that "a state has
the power to determine the title, status, or condition of property within its borders").
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on all the world as to the points which are directly in judgment before
''46 and thus,
it,
some form of intervention practice was needed to prevent
injustice against those with a legitimate right to the property in
question.4 7
By the time the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938, the drafters
had concluded that three separate rules should be included to account for
the fact that litigation between parties often implicated the rights of
others unnamed as parties. 48 The first is compulsory joinder under Rule
19. This rule recognizes that in some circumstances, the interest of the
absentee might be so affected by the outcome that the case should not be
allowed to move forward without joining the absentee. 49 The second is
the class action under Rule 23. This rule provides that in limited
circumstances, those who have come forward as named plaintiffs will be
given the right to represent the interests of others similarly situated, but
absent. 50 Finally, Rule 24 was adopted to recognize intervention. 5 1 The
drafters of this rule "explicitly saw intervention as a counterpart to
joinder., 52 Under Rule 24, an absentee would not be required to wait to
be "rung into the action by a53 party," but could demand admission to the
case as an intervening party.

46. The Mary Anne, 16 F. Cas. 953 at 954; see also Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246,
320 (1818) ("But if he were a mere stranger, he would still be bound by such sentence, because the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in rem is, as to the points directly in judgment,
conclusive upon the whole world.").
47. Indeed, intervention "is a self-help measure allowing absentees to protect themselves
when they have questions of law or fact in common with the existing action." Elizabeth Zwickert
Timmermans, Note, Has the Bowsher Doctrine Solved the Debate? The Relationship Between
Standing andlntervention as of Right, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2009).
48. WRIGHT, MILLER& KANE, supra note 1, § 1901.
49. See FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Heather P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class
CertificationExpert: The Roles of Daubert and the Defendant's Proof 28 REV. LITIG. 71, 76 (2008)
(explaining that in order to maintain any class action, Rule 23(a) requires "numerosity,
commonality, typicality,... adequacy of representation,.... [and t]here must be an identifiable
'class,' that is, a relatively large group of people who can be objectively [thought to] have similar
grievances").
51. FED. R. CIv. P. 24.
52. Appel, supra note 3, at 254.
53. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 400-01 (1967); see also Timmermans,
supranote 47, at 1413.
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2. Judicial Interpretation of Rule 24 (1937-1966): A Rigid View
On intervention of right, the 1934 original version of Rule 24 read:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) When a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
disposition
4
thereof.

Though Rule 24 has been said to be a mere "codification of general
doctrines of intervention, ' it is clear that the rule was not intended to
be a mere "restatement of existing federal practice at law and in
equity. 56 Indeed the rule, by its very terms, sought to expand
intervention beyond the in rem cases from which it was developed (and
which is still authorized by Section (a)(2)).57 Most judicial focus on the
new rule was over the generalized scope of Section (a)(2).5 Under this
provision, to establish a right to intervene, applicants were required to
demonstrate both that they would be bound by an adverse judgment and
that an existing party could not adequately represent their interests.59
After adoption of Rule 24, there was at least some tension among courts
and scholars over just how broad this right of intervention was,
particularly over the meaning of the term "bound." Some authorities
argued, and a few Courts of Appeals agreed, that "bound" should be
interpreted "to mean 'practical prejudice' to the applicant. 60 They
offered what was labeled "vague formulae" by the editors of the Yale
Law Journal in 1954, "providing for intervention of right whenever the
jeopardized' or 'the effect of the
applicant's interests are 'seriously
61
judgment would be prejudicial."'

FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), 308 U.S. 663, 690 (1939) (amended 1946).
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 1, § 1903 (quoting Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.
v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.(quoting Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133
(1967)).
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2); see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
58. Meaning of "Bound," supranote 43, at 409-10.
59. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a), 308 U.S. 663, 690 (1939) (amended 1946).
60. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 47, at 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Third Circuit, for example, found that intervention of right would be granted upon a showing that
the applicant's rights would be "affected" by an adverse court decree. Mack v. Passaic Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1945).
61. Meaning of "Bound," supra note 43, at 414 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Raoul Berger,
Intervention by PublicAgencies in PrivateLitigation in the FederalCourts, 50 YALE L.J. 65, 65 n.4
(1940) and 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 24.16 (3d ed. 195 1)).
54.
55.
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A majority of courts, however, interpreted the term "bound" to
require a showing of a possible res judicata effect.62 This interpretation
effectively limited the right to intervene to two situations-"where the
applicant's rights are derived from the same source as a litigant's and he
[or she] raises the same issues ...or where he [or she] is a privy of a
litigant., 63 These courts rejected the notion that an applicant had a right
to intervene where a judgment's practical effect would be highly
prejudicial to his or her interests.6 4 The rationale expressed was that the
protection afforded by Rule 24 is not essential to one who might have
another legal remedy available after judgment in the case at bar.65
In 1961, the Supreme Court spoke to resolve the question of just
how broad the term "bound" would be defined for purposes of
intervention by upholding the narrow approach taken by the lower courts
in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States.66 In doing so, the Court
acknowledged that Rule 24(a)(2) effectively created a "Catch-22:
movants who were not adequately represented by the existing parties
necessarily could not be bound under res judicata principles, and those
who would be bound could not demonstrate inadequate
representation." 67 Ironically, the Court had struck Rule 24(a)(2)-a rule
it adopted in 1937 68-as a viable means for intervention of right.69 What
was left, at least if the rule was read literally, was the pre-1937 right of
intervention in in rem cases, as well as in any suit for which Congress
expressly established the right to intervene.7 °

62. Timmermans, supra note 47, at 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Meaning of "Bound, " supra note 43, at 410-11.
64. Id.at 412; see also, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1951).
65. See Sutphen Estates, Inc., 342 U.S. at 21-22.
66. 366 U.S. 683, 689-91 (1961) (denying intervention to private litigants in antitrust case on
the ground that they would not be bound by adjudication of the dispute since they would not be
precluded from bringing subsequent litigation).
67. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 271-72 (footnotes omitted).
68. Letter of Submittal, 308 U.S. 649 (1939). The U.S. Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate and amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon advice of the advisory
committee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-73 (2006).
69. See Kaplan, supra note 53, at 401-02 (noting that in 1961, the Court interpreted Rule
24(a)(2) in a "crippling way" when it decided Sam Fox).
70. In truth, however, even as a majority of courts were applying a strict res judicata
requirement to the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), lower courts were at work eroding the
rigidity of the traditional equity and admiralty right to intervene embodied in Rule 24(a)(3). See,
e.g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52, 54-56 (9th Cir. 1960). As the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules noted in 1966, "some decided cases virtually disregarded the language of
this provision" and have applied "[t]he concept of a fund ... so loosely that it is possible for a court
to find a fund in almost any in personam action." FED. R. Ctv. P. 24 advisory committee's note
(1966 Amendment) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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3. Judicial Interpretation of Rule 24 (1966-Present):
An Elastic View
After Sam Fox, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the
"Committee") revised the Federal Rules to address the rigidity that the
Court had read into the term "bound" under Rule 24(a)(2). 1 While the
Committee begrudgingly acknowledged that the reasoning of Sam Fox
might be "linguistically justified," it nonetheless felt that such a strict
reading of the provision was a very "poor result[]" overall.72 The
Committee did not find it necessary-and quite possibility not
efficient-for a person who demonstrates that his or her interest is not
adequately represented by an existing party to be put at risk of having an
adverse judgment entered which would extend to him or her and thus "be
obliged to test the validity of the judgment as applied to his [or her]
interest by a later collateral attack., 73 Instead,
such person should have,
"as a general rule, ... [a right] to intervene. '74
In amending Rule 24(a) in 1966, the Committee once again
emphasized the relationship between intervention and joinder. The
Committee believed that Rule 24(a) was:
[A] kind of counterpart to Rule 19(a)(2)(i) on joinder of persons
needed for a just adjudication: where, upon motion of a party in an
action, an absentee should be joined so that he may protect his interest
which as a practical matter may be substantially impaired by the
disposition of the action, he [also]
ought to have a right to intervene in
75
the action on his own motion.
Thus, while the language of the two rules does differ, "the
Committee theoretically linked intervention and joinder, and it intended
that the new rule on intervention would fill in any gaps created by the
joinder rule."7 6
77
As a result of the 1966 amendments, Rule 24(a) now reads:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76.

Appel, supra note 3, at 254.

77. "Rule 24 has been amended eight times since it was originally adopted [in 1937], but only
the 1966 amendment is [considered to have] major significance." WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 1,§ 1903.
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applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties. 78

This amendment has had the effect the Committee intended on
intervention in federal courts. Courts in every federal circuit have read
Rule 24(a)(2) to require satisfaction of four distinct elements: (1)
timeliness of motion; (2) an interest in the property or transaction on
which the action is based; (3) a threat that the movant's interest could be
impaired by disposition of the action; and (4) a lack of adequate
representation of the movant's interest by the existing parties. 79 As a
general rule, the courts have not found that any of these four elements
pose any significant burden to intervention in litigation among private
parties.' °

78. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
79. See R & G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009);
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 573 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2009); Lease Oil Antitrust
Litig. v. Chesapeake Exploration Ltd. P'ship, 570 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2009); San Juan Cnty. v.
United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2007); Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v.
Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2007); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy Lake Props., Inc., 425
F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 220 (3d
Cir. 2005); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003); South Dakota ex
reL. Barnett v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003); Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter
v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2001); Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d
941, 945-46 (7th Cir. 2000); Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir.
1996); Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d
Cir. 1995); Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976).
80. See B. Femdndez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 2006)
(finding that cereal distributor was entitled to intervene as of right even though its parent company
was a party to the lawsuit, the court held that "[a]n intervenor has a sufficient interest in the subject
of the litigation where the intervenor's contractual rights may be affected by a proposed remedy,"
and that an intervenor needs only a "'minimal' showing" to demonstrate inadequate representation);
Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 748, 753, 761 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court's denial
of insurer's motion to intervene as of right, the court held that "[i]ntervention should generally be
allowed where 'no one would be hurt and greater justice could be attained' (quoting Sierra Club v.
Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)); Zurich Capital Mkts. Inc. v.
Coglianese, 236 F.R.D. 379, 384, 387 (N.D. Il1. 2006) (finding that mutual fund liquidator was
entitled to intervene as of right and holding with regards to timeliness of the motion that,
"[a]lthough the first factor weighs in favor of finding that the Liquidator's motion to intervene was
not timely, the Court must assess the possible prejudice to the parties to determine timeliness").
Indeed, very quickly after the 1966 amendment, the Supreme Court sent a strong signal to the lower
courts that Rule 24(a) provides for "a sweeping right to intervene." Appel, supra note 3, at 257
(discussing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967)).
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B.

Intervention in Public Law Cases

1. The View of the Courts (As Expressed)
For the most part, codification of the equity procedure of
intervention also provided for an environment in which public law
litigation could "flourish" in the federal courts. 8' While the drafters of
the Federal Rules certainly sought to address intervention and other

procedures primarily in a private law context,82 the 1966 amendments
were sufficiently expansive such that a court applying the rules would
find it very difficult to exclude intervention in a public law case.83 As

Professor Tobias explains:
To be sure, the liberal ethos pervading the Rules as a whole and the
liberality and flexibility that equity fostered in specific Rules enabled
public interest litigants to institute suit, successfully resist preliminary
motions, conduct broad discovery, and reach the merits of their claims.
Moreover, equity underlies numerous procedural measures employed
particularly when judges fashion a remedy in
in public law litigation,
84
institutional litigation.
There are those, however, who believe the Federal Rules are behind
an explosion of federal court litigation.8 5 The perception is often that
litigants are misusing the civil justice system, filing suits that lack merit,
and/or abusing procedural mechanisms by seeking a strategic
advantage 8 6 Public law litigation has not escaped this criticism. Public
81. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV.270, 286 (1989) [hereinafter Public Law Litigation].
82. Brian Hutchings, Note, Waiting for Divine Intervention: The Fifth Circuit Tries to Give
Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 43 VILL. L. REV. 693, 696
(1998); see also United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that Rule 24 contemplated traditional private litigation).
83. See Public Law Litigation, supra note 82, at 286-87.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 287.
86. Id. at 287-88. For data examination evidencing overall increase in civil trials at both the
state and federal levels, see Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor,
Examining Trial Trends in State Courts. 1976-2002, 1 J.EMPtRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768 & fig.7
(2004) (illustrating an increase in state civil trials between 1976 and 2002) and Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May Mean, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2004, at 3, 4 (explaining that the data assembled by Ostrom, Strickland & Hannaford-Agor, supra,
bears an "unmistakable resemblance to trends in federal courts"); see also David Coale & Wendy
Couture, Loud Rules, 34 PEPP. L. REg.715, 723 (2007) (stating that "[flew would dispute that there
are a great, and increasing, number of cases in today's legal system"); John W. Wade, On Frivolous
Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and ProceduralSanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 435-36
(1986) (explaining that "the whole problem has been substantially exacerbated, due perhaps ... to
the so-called litigation explosion, [and] to the substantial increase in very complex cases involving
multiple parties ....All of this has had the effect of adding greatly to the court clog and the
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interest cases have increased significantly since the 1970s.87 This area of
the law has become increasingly dominated by institutional participants,
often challenging government activity. 8 The number and types of
interests in these cases has greatly expanded, with not only civil rights,
environmental, and other public interest advocates seeking a voice in the
courtroom, but also business interests often initiating these cases or
seeking to intervene to protect their economic interests in government
policy. 89 Some have argued that these cases are crippling our judicial

system. 90
Accordingly, there have been occasional efforts by the Supreme
Court and to curtail federal court litigation in ways that certainly could
impact public law litigation. 91 And while overall, courts have remained
receptive to these cases and intervention into them by non-parties, 92 in
some instances the courts have moved to interpret Rule 24 in ways that
clearly impede public interest litigation. 93 Some of these decisions
appear to be aimed directly at cases seeking review of informal federal
rulemakings. Generally, these judicial decisions can be divided into three
categories-those that: (1) define an "interest" under Rule 24(a)
narrowly; (2) set a rebuttable presumption that a government party can
adequately represent broader public interests; and (3) require an
intervenor to establish constitutional standing.
exasperation of the courts and the public"). The Supreme Court observed this trend as far back as
the 1970s, at the mere beginning of public law growth. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 345 (1979); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
87. Public Law Litigation, supra note 82, at 293; see also Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary
System: DinosaurorPhoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1984).
88. Public Law Litigation,supra note 82, at 293.
89. See id. at 294-95; see also Jeffery Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc.: How the Nation's Highest
CourtHas Come to Side With Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 40.
90. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don 't Know
(And Think We Know) About OurAllegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
65, 67 (1983) (explaining public concern with our litigious society, Professor Galanter noted "[w]e
are told of an epidemic, avalanche, flood, tidal wave or deluge of litigation, threatening to culminate
in an 'apocalypse' or 'doomsday,"' and that others are concerned that "[s]wollen caseloads render
courts unable to lavish on cases the deliberation and craftsmanship that should distinguish courts
from other decision makers").
91. The Supreme Court in the 1970s issued advisories to lower courts to be stringent with
those filing frivolous claims or abusing the discovery process. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (recognizing in a civil antitrust action the potential for
misuse "of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"). The most
influential Supreme Court action on public interest law has clearly been its narrowing of
constitutional standing since the early 1990s. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and
Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 296-97 (2008). For a discussion on how this further
impacts intervenors in rulemaking cases, see infra Part IV.A.1.
92. Appel, supra note 3, at 282.
93. Hutchings, supra note 82, at 698 (explaining that some courts interpret Rule 24 narrowly,
requiring a showing of concrete interest in the action).
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a. Defining What Constitutes a Rule 24(a)
"Interest" in the Litigation
Rule 24(a) does not define what constitutes a sufficient "interest" in
the litigation so as to allow a court to sustain a movant's application for
intervention. 4 The Supreme Court has spoken to this issue on only a few
occasions and in doing so has sent mixed signals to the lower courts
regarding the scope of the right to intervene.95 At times, the Court has
indicated a very expansive view of what constitutes an interest. In
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 96 -- a case
decided shortly after the 1966 amendments to Rule 24-the Court felt no
need to discuss whether the term was restricted in scope or not. 97 Instead,
the Court simply acknowledged that the Advisory Committee had
desired to inject "some elasticity" into the practice of intervention, and
thus explained that "the new rule 24(a)(2) is broad enough to include
[the proposed intervenor] Cascade. 9 8 Likewise, in Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of America,99 the Court seemed to indicate that even a
generalized right in "free and democratic union elections" was a
sufficient interest to allow an individual member of a union to intervene
in an action brought by the United States to enforce federal labor laws.100
At other times, however, the Supreme Court has sent strong signals
to lower tribunals that the term "interest" should be construed far more
narrowly in considering an application to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).
For example, in Donaldson v. United States,101 the Court upheld the
denial of intervention by a taxpayer in a proceeding brought by the
Internal Revenue Service to enforce a subpoena against the applicant's
former employer. 0 2 The Court found that the proposed intervenor lacked
a sufficient interest in the action, holding that under Rule 24(a)(2), an
applicant must demonstrate a "significantly protectable interest.1 0 3
About a decade later, the Court touched upon the issue again in Diamond
v. Charles!0 4 In that case, a group of physicians had challenged the

94. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
95. See Hutchings, supra note 82, at 709.
96. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
97. See id. at 135-36.
98. Id. at 134, 136.
99. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
100. Id. at 529, 539 (quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463,
475 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. 400U.S.517(1971).
102. Id.at518-19,521,531.
103. Id. at 531.
104. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
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constitutionality of a state abortion law.'0 5 Dr. Diamond moved to
intervene on the ground that his interest as a conscientious objector to
the practice of abortion, as well as his status as a father of a teenage girl,
could be impacted by an outcome in the case.10 6 In dicta, the concurring
Justices went so far as to state that Dr. Diamond should not have been
allowed to intervene in the case; in their opinion, the "significantly
protectable interest" required in Donaldson v. United States must be a
"direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal
10 7
protection.
The response by lower courts on this issue has been equally varied
over the years.10 8 This is best represented by the difficulty the Tenth
Circuit has experienced in crafting a workable definition of Rule 24(a)'s
interest requirement and its exasperated admission that none of the
Supreme Court's opinions are "much help" at all.' 0 9 Initially, the Tenth
Circuit appeared to take a very stringent view of intervention by
requiring that the interest be "direct, substantial, and legally
protectable." 110 I will refer to this, as the Tenth Circuit did, as the "DSL
test."' 11 After announcing the DSL test in 2001, lower courts in the
circuit were arguably free to take a dim view on intervention in public
law litigation. After less than a decade, however, the Tenth Circuit was
in full retreat, dismantling the DSL test one piece at a time.12 The court
105. Id. at 57.
106. Id. at 57-58.
107. Diamond, 476 U.S, at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. See Hutchings, supra note 82, at 698-99 & n.16.
109. See, e.g., San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007).
110. Utah Ass'n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Cntys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep't of Interior,
100 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996)).
111. San Juan Cnty., 503 F.3d at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See id. at 1192-93. The court began by holding that the "direct" and "legally protectable"
components were "problematic." Id. at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to
"direct," the court concluded that "[w]hether an interest is direct or indirect could be a matter of
metaphysical debate because almost any casual connection can be represented as a chain in which
intermediate steps separate the initial act from the impact on the prospective intervenor." Id. at
1192-93. Of course, the court ignored that this is the very problem that plagues much of tort law.
See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1006 (2d Cir. 1974)
(explaining that in determining the cause of an insurance loss in commercial litigation, "the
causation inquiry stops at the efficient physical cause of the loss; it does not trace events back to
their metaphysical beginnings"); Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 349 F.2d 820, 822, 826-27 (5th Cir.
1965) (discussing asserted contributory negligence: "Here he wants the good old fashioned dialectic
of proximate causation with all of its built-in metaphysical concepts of natural and unbroken
sequence, but for, foreseeability of harm and the like. His reasoning is fascinating and beguiling.");
Ala. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 73 So. 205, 207 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916) (finding that emotional
disturbance is metaphysical and "too subtle and speculative to be capable of []measurement by any
standard known to the law"). The Page court added: "This effort to cross examine the jury-whether
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concluded that while the test worked just fine where a proposed
11 3
intervenor had a DSL interest, the test otherwise "misse[d] the point.
As the court understood Rule 24(a)(2), "the factors mentioned in the
Rule are intended to capture the circumstances in which the practical
in the
effect on the prospective intervenor justifies its participation
14
litigation. Those factors are not rigid, technical requirements."'
Other circuits have followed the Tenth Circuit in professing to
apply a very liberal interpretation of the term "interest" in Rule
24(a)(2)." 5 Others have opted for "narrower articulations of the interest
requirement,"' 6 choosing to read the Rule's language on what the Tenth
Circuit labeled "an overly technical manner."' 7 These circuits continue
to adhere to the DSL test." 8 Of particular note is the Seventh Circuit's
stringent application of the DSL test in public law cases." 9 That circuit
has gone as far as to suggest that the interest requirement is more
rigorous than what a plaintiff must show to have constitutional standing
in a public law case.1 20 This arguably "erects special barriers to
special interrogatories are used or in outlining the successive fact findings as a predicate for a
general verdict-leads only to confusion and a proliferation of metaphysical terms scarcely
understandable to the most astute scholar." Page, 349 F.2d at 826-27. With regard to the term
"legally protectable," the court noted that it had already found that term problematic in the context
of constitutional standing. San Juan Cnty., 503 F.3d at 1193. Notably, as discussed infra Part
II.B.1.c, the Tenth Circuit is one of the jurisdictions that rejects that a proposed intervenor must
demonstrate individual standing in the action to proceed.
113. San Juan Cty., 503 F.3dat 1193.
114. Id at 1195. The court further noted with great interest that "leading treatises on the subject
appear to share a similar reading of Rule 24(a)(2)." Id.
115. See WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 573 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2009) ("We
'follow[] a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention."') (alteration in original) (quoting Utah
Ass'n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 780 (6th
Cir. 2007) (explaining that "this Circuit 'has opted for a rather expansive notion of the interest
sufficient to invoke intervention of right') (quoting Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240,
1245 (6th Cir. 1997)); Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that, "'the interest [asserted] is protectable under some law,' and.., there is a
'relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue"') (emphasis added)
(quoting Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995),
abrogated by Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in
original)); see also Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976)
(assuming that Virginia's interest in "the 'general welfare' of its citizens" is a sufficient interest
under Rule 24(a)(2)).
116. See Hutchings, supra note 82, at 716-17.
117. SanJuan Cty., 503 F.3dat 1196.
118. See, e.g., Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. v. Chesapeake Exploration Ltd. P'ship, 570 F.3d 244,
251 (5th Cir. 2009) (modifying, slightly, the "direct" requirement to "sufficiently related," however
maintaining a relatively strict adherence to the DSL test); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc.,
419 F.3d 216, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2005).
119. Vreeland, supranote 4, at 288; see also Public Law Litigation, supranote 82, at 323-25.
120. Vreeland, supranote 4, at 288.
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intervention by public interests groups, whose interests by definition are
not susceptible to direct injury in the same sense as those of traditional
private parties."'' 21 This leads to the result that while a public interest
organization is barred from intervening in a case that "as a practical
matter" could impede the interests of its members, those asserting an
economic or property interest, such as an industry applicant, are given
more access to intervention.
b. A Rebuttable Presumption that the Government Adequately
Represents the Public Interest
When the government is an existing party, some courts have further
scrutinized applications for intervention on the presumption that the
government can adequately represent the interest of all its citizens. ,22 To
overcome this presumption, a proposed intervenor must specifically
demonstrate an interest that is different from the general public interest
which was unrepresented.1 23 Again, this arguably could make it easier
for economic interests to intervene in cases reviewing informal
rulemaking, as courts regularly recognize that the government does not
represent specific business interests. 124 On the other hand, groups like
121. Id.at289.
122. See Kathy Black, Comment, Trashing the Presumption: Intervention on the Side of the
Government, 39 ENVTL. L. 481, 482-83 (2009). The most extreme example of this presumption was
the Ninth Circuit's "federal defendant rule," which categorically excluded defendant-intervenors in
actions brought under the APA to challenge the government's compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (the "NEPA"). See Stephanie D. Matheny, Note, Who Can Defend a
Federal Regulation? The Ninth Circuit Misapplied Rule 24 by Denying Intervention of Right in
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1083-84 (2003). In a series of cases
that expanded more than twenty years, that circuit has placed a heavy burden on any party seeking
the right to intervene to defend a NEPA challenge. Id. Since the introduction of this rule in Portland
Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit has:
stated two discrete rationales for denying defendant-side intervention. First, the court has
adopted a blanket federal defendant rule, holding that because only the federal
government can violate NEPA, it is the only proper defendant in a NEPA challenge.
Second, in many of the same cases, the court also denied intervention because the
applicants asserted purely economic injuries that fall outside of NEPA's zone of interest
for the environment. These two competing rationales have led to ambiguity in the Ninth
Circuit's application of Rule 24, particularly when absentees assert environmental
injuries.
Matheny, supra at 1083-84. The Ninth Circuit abandoned the federal defendant rule in January 2011
when it decided, en bane, Wilderness Soc'y v. US. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir.
2011). For background on the NEPA, see generally Michael C. Blumm, The National
Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990).
123. See Katharine Geopp, Note, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention As of Right
When the Government Is a Party, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131, 162 (2002) (explaining that "if the
intervenor asserts an interest that is private or identifiably distinct from the general public interest,
Rule 24(a)(2) and Trbovich indicate that intervention should be allowed with a minimal burden").
124. See Black, supra note 122, at 496; see, e.g., Univ. of Kan. Ctr. for Research, Inc. v. United
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public interest groups attempting to intervene in cases on non-economic
grounds-such as to protect public health and welfare-face
inconsistent, if not a more rigid, presumption. 125
c. Requiring Intervenors to Demonstrate Article III Standing
The last judicial barrier that has been imposed on proposed
intervenors in public law litigation is the requirement that the applicant
demonstrate an independent basis for standing. To invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal court, the plaintiff must satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. 26 A public
interest organization has standing to bring a suit in its own name "when
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the
interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit." 127 The test for individual standing
has three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in
fact" which must be "(a) concrete and particularized,. . . and (b) actual
or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."",128 Second, the injury
must "be 'fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant.' ' 1 29 Third, it must be "likely," and not "speculative," that the
relief will prevent or redress the injury. 13 This test ensures that the
correct parties are before the court and that the court is resolving an
actual case or controversy.
The circuit courts are not in agreement as to whether the interest
required to confer Article III standing is "greater, lesser than, or
equivalent to the interest required" under Rule 24(a).13 1 As already
noted, the Seventh Circuit has equated the DSL test to constitutional
standing and rejected that narrow reading of the intended right to
intervene under the Federal Rules. 32 A majority of courts, regardless of
their view of the DSL test, have tended to reject that the interest required
for intervention is as weighty as the interest required by the Cases or

States, No. 08-2565-JAR, 2009 WL 2877645, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 2, 2009).
125. Black, supra note 122, at 496-97.
126. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. I.
127. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
128. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976)).
130. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Timmermans, supranote 47, at 1412.
132. See supranotes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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134
Controversies Clause in Article 111.133 Some courts however, disagree.
In their view, because the intervenor wants to enter the case on "'equal
footing' with the original parties, Article III requirements" must be met
before granting the application. 35 The Supreme Court has not spoken
directly to the proper relationship between Article III standing and
intervention of right under Rule 24(a), so for now we must live with this
split of authority among the circuit courts of appeals. 36 But given the
role of the courts in our constitutional system to adjudicate disputes
about "legal" rights as opposed to personal interest, it seems impossible
to escape the conclusion that some interplay between the two doctrines
must surely exist and that this relationship needs to be resolved with
certainty in order to appropriately determine when a third-party can
participate in existing litigation. In this regard, I will return to the these
two doctrines in Part IV where I will suggest that the interest required
under Rule 24(a) for intervention should be akin to the interest
component of the Supreme Court's standing test, although I would not
necessarily conclude, as some courts have, that all standing requirements
need to be met by a proposed intervenor.137

2. The View of the Courts (As Implied)
To date, the limits on intervention in public law cases that the
courts have fashioned are expressly based on the technicalities of the
language of Rule 24(a) or at least ambiguities in that language.1 38 The
hesitation of some courts, however, to apply a broad right of review in
public law cases involving informal rulemaking might very well be
based upon some doubt within the judiciary over the benefit of
intervention, particularly defendant-intervention, in such cases. As
133. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 529-31 (1972) (allowing a
union member to intervene in action against union even though member could not institute his own
action under applicable statute); San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.
2007) (holding that "applicants for intervention need not establish standing"); Fund for Animals,
Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that "the NRD has established its
Article III
standing, and that lack of standing is not a ground for rejecting its motion to intervene as
of right"); Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Bosworth, 221 F.R.D. 488, 492 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (explaining
that "[t]ypically, [other circuits] regard the imposition of a standing requirement in the intervention
context as unsupported by law and unnecessarily burdensome"); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 158 F.R.D.
143, 146 (D. Minn. 1994) (explaining that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not demand
that a party have standing to sue in order to intervene as a party, the Supreme Court has declined to
decide whether an intervenor must have such standing,.. . and our Court of Appeals imposes no
such standing requirement") (citation omitted).
134. See Timmermans, supra note 47, at 1412.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See infra Part IV.A.1.
138. See supra Part lI.B.l.a-b.
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already noted, traditional public interest law cases often involved civil
rights issues. 139 Certainly, in those cases brought to vindicate civil rights,
there is often a need to protect the constitutional rights of plaintiffs,
defendants, and often non-parties, and courts can better fashion a remedy
to do so by expanding the voices heard in the case through use of Rule
24(a). For reasons that I now turn to, it is dubious that a similar
reasoning for intervention can be applied to judicial review of informal
agency rulemaking.
III.

WHY INTERVENTION IN RULEMAKING CASES IS CONTRARY TO
THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE APA

A.

American AdministrativeProcess

1. Rejection of the Adversarial System of Public Policy Making
At the heart of the modem administrative state is the rejection of an
adversarial model of government decision-making. The American legal
system was built upon a model of private litigants testing and expanding
the scope of statutory and common-law principles on a case-by-case
basis. 140 Public policy development under this model, while certainly
deliberate, ultimately became too slow to adequately respond to rapidly
changing economic and social conditions of a burgeoning, increasingly
industrialized America.14' Thus, at the dawn of the twentieth century,
42
new theories of administrative processes began to emerge.1
Progressives, and then the New Dealers, sought a system of
comprehensive governmental planning for developing social and
economic infrastructure. 4 3 James Landis and other early proponents of
the administrative state were "encouraged in the possibilities of planning
[where an agency] did not always wait for problems to arise in the form
of a case or controversy; [but] looked ahead and prepared itself by

139. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
140. Lawyers at the dawn of the modem administrative state fought hard to maintain this
adversarial model. See Verkuil, supra note 13, at 265. Lawyers at the time preferred the courts for
two reasons: (1) "jury trials and other procedural protections meant less control by the
decisionmaker over the process" and (2) "the judiciary's antipathy to [new, bureaucratic]
government programs." Id.
141. See Harris, supra note 14, at 279-80.
142. See id. at 281-82.
143. Id. at281-83.
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investigation and study." 144 Their vision was a45new form of regulation of
enterprise based upon administrative process. 1
146
Today, "[a]gencies are bureaucracies of public administration."'
While the power that agencies exercise is certainly similar in some
regards to the exercise of judicial and legislative power, it is distinct
from that conceived by the Constitution. Unlike the courts, agencies do
not interpret their statutory obligations with strict, objective attention to
the text, structure, and history of a particular piece of legislation.147 Nor
are they equipped to handle the politic-laden legislative function of
Congress, as no true political checks are incorporated into the agency
rulemaking structure. 148 Agencies are tasked with a much narrower
objective within our system: to enable the enforcement of congressional
directives through application of expertise, practicality, broad
stakeholder input, and inclusion of political considerations. 49 Agencies
have the "expert judgment and public policy acumen,"' 150 the means "to
collect and digest ... volumes of information," and the necessary
"flexibility to respond to changing" circumstances as needed to ensure
effective policy-making and implementation.' 1 While not always
realized in practice, the value of administrative process is, and always
has been, its ability52 to produce government policy in an efficient,
streamlined manner.1

144. Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 322
(1964).
145.

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 122 (1938). As Mr. Landis explained:

So much in the way of hope for the regulation of enterprise, for the realization of claims
to a better livelihood has, since the turn of the century, been made to rest upon the
administrative process. To arm it with the means to effectuate those hopes is but to
preserve the current of American living. To leave it powerless to achieve its purposes is
to imperil too greatly the things that we have learned to hold dear.
Id.
146. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678 (2007).
147. See id

148. See id. at 679-80 (explaining the flexibility in the administrative rulemaking function of an
agency). See generally Krauss, supra note 15 (discussing the largely unchecked power of
government agencies).
149. Foote, supranote 146, at 691.
150.

Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive Approach to Synthesizing

Chevron and Mead, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 32 (2005).
151. David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of Administrative
Power,51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2183 (2010).
152. See id. at 2183-84.
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2. The APA
The transformation from the adversarial system to administrative
process left open many questions regarding how best to limit
bureaucratic power and protect individual rights. As Nobel laureate, and
then secretary of state, Elihu Root explained it in 1916:
There is one special field of law development which has manifestly
become inevitable. We are entering upon the creation of a body of
administrative law quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and its
necessary safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific
statutes enforced by the courts.... There will be no withdrawal from
these experiments. We shall go on; we shall expand them, whether we
approve theoretically or not, because such agencies furnish protection
to rights and obstacles to wrong doing [sic] which under our new social
and industrial conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old
and simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last
generation. [Of course these new agencies] carry with them great and
dangerous opportunities [for] oppression and wrong. [Thus they must
also be] regulated. The limits of their power.., must be fixed and
determined.
The rights of the citizen against them must be made
15 3
plain.
The task for those defending the new administrative state was to
create a system of institutional safeguards involving internal and external
processes.1 14 Ultimately, Congress would enact the APA in 1946, "[t]o
improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative
procedure.' ', 55 "[T]he APA established the fundamental relationship
between regulatory agencies and those whom they regulate-between
government, on the one hand, and private citizens, business, and the
economy, on the other hand.' ' 156 The Act sought to strike a balance
between promoting individual rights and maintaining the policymaking
153. Elihu Root, Public Service by the Bar, 2 A.B.A.J. 736, 749-50 (1916). For a discussion of
the turbulent debate between public and private rights under agency process during this period of
time, see generally Walter Gellhom, The Administrative ProcedureAct: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.

REv. 219 (1986).
154. See Felix Frankfurter, The Task ofAdministrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618 (1927).
As Justice Frankfurter explained it, "[t]hese safeguards [will] largely depend on a highly
professionalized civil service, an adequate technique of administrative application of legal
standards, a flexible, appropriate, and economical procedure ... easy access to public scrutiny, and
a constant play of criticism by an informed and spirited bar." Id.
155. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). In truth, the APA was in large part a compromise
between those in Congress who continued to view the adversarial model as superior and those who
had supported the President's New Deal polices. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L.

REv. 1557 (1996).
156. Shepherd, supranote 155, at 1558.
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flexibility envisioned by the New Dealers.157 As the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted at the time of the Act's passage in Congress, the APA
"'is designed to provide . . fairness in administrative operation' and 'to
assure ... the effectuation of the declared policy of Congress."' 15 8
The basic structure of the APA exemplifies these twin goals. First,
it establishes procedural "requirements concerning public access to
agency law, agency rulemaking procedure, agency adjudication
procedure, and[, in many aspects most importantly,] judicial review of
agency action.'' 159 The Act generally divides the universe of "agency
action into two classes-rulemaking and adjudication[s]-and subject[s]
each class to separate procedural schemes.' 160 The APA further breaks
down both rulemaking and adjudication into two procedural varietiesformal and informal.' 61 For purposes of this Article, I focus exclusively
on informal rulemakings under the APA. 162 In general, in the modem era
of administrative law, it is through informal rulemaking that agencies
within the Executive Branch have tended to make wholesale changes to

157. See id. The Act was enacted "largely in response to the tremendous and unprecedented
[growth] of the administrative state ... and the concomitant backlash to this expansion [from] the
legal and business communities." Breger, supra note 18, at 338.
158. See McNollgast, The PoliticalOrigins of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 180, 180 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 252 (1945)).
159. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REv.
297, 303 (1986) (footnotes omitted). "The first broad concept embodied in the federal APA and
emulated by the states concerns the desirability of a general and comprehensive APA." Id.
(emphasis in original).
160.

Id. at 308; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947) [hereinafter AG MANUAL] (explaining that "the entire
Act is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication"). "Rulemaking involves[, as
the name implies,] the issuance of [agency] rules" and regulations, which are generally defined as
"statements of general applicability prescribing law or policy." Bonfield, supranote 159, at 325; see
also AG MANUAL, supra, at 14 (explaining nilemaking as "agency action which regulates the future
conduct of either groups of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative in nature, not only
because it operates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy
considerations"). "[A]djudication[, on the other hand,] involves the issuance of [agency] orders,"
which can be defined as statements of particular applicability [that] determin[e] the rights of
specified parties that then may be relied upon by agencies as precedents. Bonfield, supranote 159,
at 325; see also AG MANUAL, supra, at 14-15 (explaining that "adjudication is concerned with the
determination of past and present rights and liabilities.... [lt may involve the determination of a
person's right to benefits under existing law so that the issues relate to whether he is within the
established category of persons entitled to such benefits").
161. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 5-6 (4th ed. 2006).
162. I do not specifically address judicial review of other agency actions, such as adjudications,
in this Article. However, for reasons that will become apparent, I prefer improving administrative
decision-making of all kinds by placing greater emphasis on improving administrative process and
deemphasizing the role of judicial review. Thus, I tend to want to rid all judicial review of agency
action from the added burden of intervention. See infra Part V.
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public policy in areas affecting the environment, education, public health
and safety, communications, and other social and economic aspects of
American life. 163
a. Procedural Requirements and the Role of the
Public in Informal Agency Rulemaking
The procedural requirements of the APA for informal rulemakings
are found in Section 553 of the APA. 164 The APA requires that an
agency engaged in informal rulemaking provide notice to the public of
the proposed rule, an opportunity for public comment, and the public
165
issuance of a statement of basis and purpose of the final rule adopted.
These requirements are commonly referred to as "notice-and-comment
rulemaking"' 166 and they impose a significant duty on the agency to both
obtain and consider broad public input on the policy choices the agency
intends to make during rulemaking. 167 As the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia put it, the notice and comment requirements in
informal rulemakings:
are designed (1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via
exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected
parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop
evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and

thereby enhance the quality ofjudicial review. 168

163. See Pedersen, supra note It, at 38. Informal rulemaking has become the primary
procedural tool used by agencies to make future changes in governmental policy that will impact
large segments of the population or the economy. Id. As one author has put it:
[t]hrough the rulemaking process pass the sum and substance of the hopes and fears of
this democratic nation. We will understand it, our government, and ourselves better when
we treat rulemaking as the most important source of law and policy for the conduct of
our daily lives. It will occupy that status unless the improbable occurs and we find some
very different way to govern ourselves.
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE

POLICY 279 (2d ed. 1999). It should also be noted that while both formal and informal rulemaking
are available to an agency under Section 553 of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), formal
rulemaking procedure is rarely, if ever, utilized by modem administrative agencies. Edward Rubin,
It's Time to Make the Administrative ProcedureAct Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 10607 (noting that "formal rulemaking has turned out to be a null set" in that since "the impracticalities
of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely requires this technique, and courts avoid
interpreting statutes torequire it, even in the rare cases where the statute seems to do so").
164. See5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
165. Id.; see also Am. Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
166. LUBBERS, supra note 161, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
168. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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b. The Role of the Courts on APA Informal Rulemaking
The APA gives the courts an important role in the administrative
process by giving the judiciary the power to determine whether an
agency acted within its authority, and within reason, in making its
decision. Section 702 of the Act reads "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
170
review thereof., 169 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc. v. Volpe,
the Supreme Court case that directly considered the applicable scope of
review of informal agency rulemaking, the Court held that all agency
actions "must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law' or if the
action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional
requirements." 1 7 1 This test has been dubbed the "arbitrary and
capricious" test,1 72 or "hard look" review. 73 In general, the duty of a
court reviewing informal agency rulemaking is to ascertain whether the
agency examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the decision made. 7 4 Most importantly,
judicial review is not intended to recreate an adversarial process. The
APA focuses on the rationality of an agency's decision-making process
rather than on the rationality of the actual decision; "[i]t is well
established that an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis
articulated by the agency itself."1 75 While the agency is certainly not
shielded from "a thorough, probing, in-depth review" of its decision by

169. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
170. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
171. Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). The Court held that the
action at issue in the case was "nonajudicatory, quasi-legislative in nature." Id. at 415 (emphasis
added).
172. See, e.g., Kelly Kunsch, Standardof Review (State and Federal). A Primer, 18 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 11, 40 (1994) (noting that the term should properly be phrased "arbitrary or capricious"
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedureand Process: Agency Duties of Explanationfor Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 324 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); Patricia M.
Wald, JudicialReview in Midpassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts and Agencies Plays
On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 227 (1996).
174. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
175. Id.at 50; see also Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (explaining that judicial review by a
court must be made "on the full administrative record" before the agency at the time it made the
decision).
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the court,176 ultimately, the scope of review "is narrow and a court is not
to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency" as set out in the
177
administrative record.

B. As a PracticalMatter, Intervention
Undermines the Administrative Process
The provisions of the APA should be "construed reasonably" and in
a manner "which will fairly balance the requirements and interests of
private persons and governmental agencies. ,,178Unotn
Unfortunately, tecus
the courts
have not always heeded this advice. To the contrary:
Over the past two decades, administrative law scholars have
identified hard look judicial review of agency action under the arbitrary
and capricious clause of the [APA] as one of, if not the major,
impediment to regulatory flexibility. Such scholars contend that
review, as currently implemented by the courts, places so many
analytic burdens and such uncertainty on agency policymaking that it
discourages agencies from acting even when regulatory changes are
needed. This position is reflected in the commonly stated adage that
judicial review causes ossification of the rulemaking process. In
essence, these critics argue that judicial review raises the costs 179of
agency adoption of new policy and thereby discourages such action.
Certainly, the fact that defendant-intervention as of right is often
sought, and allowed, in these cases is not the only reason that judicial
review has eroded the efficiency of the administrative process. But it is a
factor. The courts in these cases are placed in a difficult position in
considering applications to intervene. On one hand, given the narrow
scope of judicial review and that the argument is limited to the
administrative record, 180 it is unclear that a court could benefit from
numerous defense briefs that review the same arguments. 181 Not only do
courts face the likelihood of information overload,' 82 but also
information degradation as intervenors seek to incorporate irrelevant
arguments or otherwise reduce the effectiveness of record material
before the court.' 83 On the other hand, when a court chooses to deny
176. OvertonPark, 401 U.S. at 415.
177. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
178. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 224 (1945).
179. Seidenfeld, supra note 20, at 251-52 (footnotes omitted).
180. Overton Park,401 U.S. at 420.
181. Appel, supra note 3, at 281.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 429 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(explaining that "It]he intervenor has offered no valid basis for reconsideration of our earlier
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intervention, it faces the very real possibility of a lengthy appeal that will
further delay judicial review. 184 In sum, intervention practice often harms
the rights of those entitled to judicial review under the APA and, most
importantly, the public's right to efficient (and fair) resolution of
regulatory matters.
1. The Redundancy of Defendant-Intervention
It is not unusual for defendant-intervention to be opposed by
plaintiffs in APA rulemaking cases on the basis that the intervenor will
unduly complicate the court's review of the agency action. 185 In general,
this rationale goes against one of the most oft made arguments in support
of a broad right to intervene in public law cases: that "intervenors make
new arguments and bring to light evidence that would otherwise not be
before the court."' 8 6 This inconsistency highlights the very difference
between public law cases generally, and APA rulemaking review
cases-the very closed nature of the court's review.
Today, it is black letter law that an agency's reason in promulgating
a rule must be documented solely by reference to the administrative
record.8 7 As the Supreme Court explained in its landmark administrative
law opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc. v. Volpe, judicial
review of an agency's rulemaking must be based "on the full
administrative record" before the agency at the time it made the
decision. 188 The Court clarified this mandate in Camp v. Pitts, 89 finding
that "the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the
reviewing court."' 190 Thus, while informal proceedings "are not on the
rejection of this argument, and the Government has not even seen fit to raise the issue. Intervenor's
position obviously lacks any merit, and we accordingly reject it"); Hazel Green Ranch, LLC v. U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, No. 1:07-CV-00414 OWW SMS,2008 WL 2876194, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July
24, 2008) (noting that outside of bringing its motion pursuant to a different Federal Rule, there was
no substantive difference between intervenors' arguments and the government); Siskiyou Reg'l
Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. Civ. 03-3013-CO, 2003 WL 23976954, at *5 (D. Or. June
16, 2003) (noting that proposed intervenors "would not contribute to the development of the
relevant issues in [the] case" and that "allowing [the proposed intervenors] to interject their
proposed arguments would confuse the relevant issues in [the] case").
184. See infra Part HI.B.2.
185. See, e.g., Response to the State of Wyoming's Motion to Intervene, Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Morgenweck, No. 04-F-0108 (OES) (D. Colo.Apr. 16, 2004).
186. Appel, supra note 3, at 295.
187. See, e.g., Breger, supranote 18, at 354.
188. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,420 (1971).
189. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
190. Id. at 142; see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985)
(explaining that "[t]he task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of
review, 5 U. S. C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the
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record in the technical sense of the APA, there is, nevertheless, a record
in another sense."' 191
Exceptions to this limitation on judicial review are rare. In narrow
circumstances, district courts have permitted:
extra-record evidence: (1) if admission is necessary to determine
"whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has
explained its decision," (2) if "the agency has relied on documents not
in the record," (3) "when supplementing the record is necessary to
matter," or (4) "when
explain technical terms or complex subject 192
plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith."
"These... exceptions operate to identify and plug holes in the
are "widely
administrative record. 1 93 Although these exceptions
' 94
accepted, [they] are narrowly construed and applied."'
Moreover, these exceptions are intended to primarily benefit the
party seeking review.' 95 After-the-fact rationalization by defendants will
"not cure noncompliance by the agency" to fully explain its decision in
the record.' 96 Likewise, even where a defendant's arguments are
compelling, "[t]he reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up
for such deficiencies; [it] may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency's action that the agency itself has not given."' 97 In short, a court
is obligated to review, and the agency obligated to make available to the
court, all the actual documents and information that were before the
agency at the time that it made its decision.1 98 The court is not to engage
in an adversarial process in which the parties in the litigation develop
extraneous arguments for and against the agency's rulemaking.199
reviewing court").
191. Gordon G. Young, JudicialReview of InformalAgency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of Judicial
Review "On the Record," 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 208 (1996).
192. Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sw. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted));
Custer Cnty. Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1027 n.1(10th Cir. 2001); see also Steven
Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of
AdministrativeAction, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 343-44 (1984).
193. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030.
194. Id.
195. See generally Stark & Wald, supra note 192 (discussing the development of the
exceptions to the limitation on the judiciary to review the agency's decision solely by reference to
the administrative record in light of the benefit to the party seeking review).
196. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 1976).
197. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29,43 (1983).
198. See Young, supra note 191, at 208-10; see also Pedersen, supra note 11, at 62-63.
199. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 50; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973);
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
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Likewise, unlike in traditional public law cases, courts in APA
proceedings are not tasked with developing expansive, judicially
directed remedies. Arguably, Section 706 of the APA provides the only
remedy available in these cases: "[t]he reviewing court shall ...hold
unlawful and set aside agency action.., found to be... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law... [or] without observance of procedure required by law. 2 °°
Although courts have found that, in finding an agency action unlawful, a
regulation should not be set aside while on remand due to equitable
considerations, in these cases, use of other procedural mechanisms, like
limited permissive intervention, can be used to protect the interests of
third-parties.20 '
In short, the justification for intervention in public law cases simply
does not hold water in rulemaking cases. While it is certainly true that it
is in the public interest to increase the range of voices heard in
developing public policy, 20 2 unlike in traditional public law cases, this
opportunity was already available in the context of the underlying
administrative proceeding. Certainly, to the extent those voices support
the rulemaking, they are part of the record, and therefore can be raised in
the court proceedings without replicating the rulemaking process.20 3
Indeed, judges are regularly seeking ways to limit intervention and can
find themselves in need of chastising intervenors for seeking to expand
the case beyond the administrative record and the court's narrow
standard of review. As the late Judge Figa from the District of Colorado
put it regarding one intervenor's attempt to expand the proceedings in a
rulemaking review case under the Federal Endangered Species Act (the
"4ESA"9):
[Intervenor] responds to Plaintiffs' Petition for Review with a
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Review
of Agency Action and attaches voluminous exhibits thereto. The
memorandum does little more than restate the status of [Yellowstone
cutthroat trout ("YCT")] management in Wyoming and the state's
perception of its success. It also addresses the existence (or lack
thereof) of YCT within its waterways and offers substantive argument
in opposition to plaintiffs' contention that the YCT population is
declining. In the Court's order allowing Wyoming's intervention, the

200. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (emphasis added).
201. See infra Part V.B.
202. See Appel, supra note 3, at 295. Proponents for intervention in public law cases also argue
that intervenors might bring better lawyers to the case. Id. This seems to be a dubious claim. In any
case, "a non-party is not entitled to the best lawyer available" in these cases. Id.at 298.
203. See Camp, 411 U.S. at 142.
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Court directed Wyoming to limit its arguments to "the adequacy of its
management plans and policies for Yellowstone cutthroat trout to the
extent, ifat all, that such plans and policies have any bearing on the
issues plaintiffs raise in their complaint." . . .[The Intervenor] does not
appear to have followed this directive. For the most part its arguments
are irrelevant to the narrow legal issue at hand, whether
2 4 defendants'
actions violated certain provisions of the ESA and APA. 0

2. The Alternative: Unreasonable Delay
For those courts desiring to limit intervention in APA rulemaking
cases, the alternative can be even more damaging to the administrative
process. As a general rule, a person denied intervention under Rule 24
has the right of immediate appeal.2 °5 When intervention issues are on
appeal, the merits of the case often cannot be resolved. Instead, courts
choose to wait for resolution of the appeal before proceeding, amounting
to what is essentially a stay of the action. 2°6 As one district court
explained it, "any action [allowed or taken] for the development of the
case without the opportunity of the proposed intervenors to participate
therein [would] be inconsistent with the questions pending on appeal as

204. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Morgenweck, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1139 n.2 (D. Colo.
2004).
205. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947); see also
Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2011); WildEarth
Guardians v. Nat'l Park Serv., 604 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); Meadowfield Apartments, Ltd.
v. United States, 261 F. App'x 195, 196 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Credit Francias, Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita,
Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1996); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 581 F.2d 175, 176
n.1 (8th Cir. 1978). For an example of such an appeal being denied, see Hadix v. Caruso, 420 F.
App'x 480, 489-90 (6th Cir. 2011), finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal under
Rule 24 because it is not a final decision, ending the litigation of the case below on the merits.
206. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging
that the court held the appeal on the merits "in abeyance" to first decide the motion to intervene).
Even where the court does not expressly state it intends to wait for resolution of a proposed
intervenors' appeal, it is often clear from the docket that the merits of the case simply came to a halt
while the denial of intervention was on appeal. For example, in Pogliani v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, after the district court denied their motion, the proposed intervenors filed an
appeal on April 27, 2004. Notice of Appeal, Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 01-CV0951 (NAMIDRH) (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2004), ECF No. 83. The District Court's next substantive
action on the case, the entry ofjudgment, did not occur until March 28, 2007-after the appeal was
decided. See Memorandum-Decision and Order at 2, Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
1:01-CV-0951 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007), ECF No. 87. Similarly, in WildEarth Guardians v.
National Park Service, the proposed intervenors filed a notice of appeal on December 11, 2008.
Notice of Appeal, WildEarth Guardians v. Nat'l Park Serv., No. I:08-cv-00608-MSK-CBS (D.
Colo. Dec. 11, 2008), ECF No. 75. The District Court took no further substantive action in the case
until March 23, 2001, when it finally issued its judgment affirming the agency action. Opinion and
Order Affirming Agency Action, WildEarth Guardians v. Nat'l Park Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1150,
1152 (D. Colo. 2011).
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to whether they [were] entitled to such rights., 20 7 Given that appeals can
take up to a year or more to resolve, °8 the impact on the efficiency of
the administrative process is clear: an outright delay in resolution of
important public policymaking. Even more alarming, this delay can
occur despite a Congressional mandate setting forth express timetables
for agency rulemaking.20 9
IV.

WHY INTERVENTION IN RULEMAKING CASES IS CONTRARY TO
THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE FEDERAL RULES

A.

Revisiting the Concept of a Rule 24(a)(2) "Interest"

As already noted, courts have struggled to define what constitutes
an appropriate "interest" in public interest litigation under Rule
24(a)(2).2 1° What we do know is that as a general matter, scholars before
1966 were dissatisfied with the "shoddy and unimaginative" approach
employed by courts when it came to the Federal Rules. 21 1 Too much
emphasis was placed on the legal impact of the litigation on absentee
parties, as opposed to the practical impact. Thus, as Professor John W.
Reed observed in 1957:
[T]here is nevertheless a very proper reluctance to make a
determination which may affect adversely the interests of A [the absent
person]. The distinction is between affecting A's rights legally and
affecting them factually. Since the court is without power to adjudicate
the rights of A, it is clear that the court's determination of the
controversy between the parties who are present will not and cannot
legally affect A's rights. But the decision may, in fact, affect A's
interests, as where he is left with a claim against one of the parties in
the first action which, although technically unimpaired, is practically

207. Maine v. Norton, 148 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D. Me. 2001).
208. See FrequentlyAsked Questions, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.
gov/content/faq.php (last updated Nov. 1, 2001). According to the Ninth Circuit, for a civil appeal, it
takes "approximately 12-20 months from the notice of appeal date" to oral argument. 1d.
209. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2683 (2006) ("Within 18 months after October 28, 1992, the [EPA]
Administrator shall promulgate regulations which shall identify... lead-based paint hazards .... ");
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (2006) ("As soon as practicable, but not later than two years after October 22,
1976, the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall ... promulgate regulations ... that set out the process[es]
for the development and revision of the land management plans [for federal public forests and
rangelands.]"); 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (a)(1)(A) (2006) ("[W]ithin 30 days after December 31, 1970, [the
EPA Administrator] shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a national primary ambient air
quality standard.").
210. See supra Part lI.B.l.a.
211. John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Partiesin CivilActions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 355
(1957).
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and factually worthless; and it is small comfort to him to be informed

that his claim is legally intact. So, although the old jurisdictional
bugbear be done away with, courts unquestionably must 212
seek to avoid
determinations which will adversely affect absent parties.

While this description similarly leaves many questions about the
scope of an appropriate interest, I propose that it, along with the
Advisory Committee's notes on Rule 24, strongly suggest that the
drafter's of the federal rule envisioned that three factors would come into
play in considering whether an absentee party could (or must) be made
part of the action.
1. Factor 1: The Interest Must Be in a Legal Right
The absentee's "interest" must be in the form of a recognized legal
"right." Courts are in the business of adjudicating rights, not mere
disputes about policy. It would not be a sufficient interest, therefore, that
the absentee has a specific emotional attachment to the case or some
vague outrage about one of the party's positions. 3
As discussed in Part II, the unanswered question is whether the
interest in a legal right required by Rule 24(a) is identical to the interest
required by Article III of the Constitution.214 It would be difficult to
propose, however, that in drafting Rule 24(a), the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee would have expected that the proposed intervenor
would also need to show an "injury in fact" that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of an existing party. 215 The Committee clearly spoke in
terms of "practical" impairment of a third-party's rights.216 This standard
is less stringent than requiring a party to demonstrate that his or her legal
interest in an action is not only "concrete and particularized," but also
that injury to that interest is "actual or imminent. 21 7
Moreover, standing is a doctrine intended to act as the court's
gatekeeper: a party must demonstrate standing to "invoke the court's
jurisdiction" in the first instance.218 But once jurisdiction is properly

212. Id.at 336 (emphasis omitted).
213. See Appel, supra note 3, at 280. This view of an interest is consistent with the view of
some past Supreme Court Justices, that a "significantly protectable interest" under Rule 24(a)(2)
must be "a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal protection." Diamond
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214.

215.
omitted).
216.
217.
218.

See supra Part H.B.l.e.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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invoked, courts have regularly allowed other parties to participate. For
example, with respect to adding plaintiffs after initiation of the lawsuit,
the Supreme Court has recognized the principle that standing of one is
standing for all. That is, Article III standing is generally satisfied so long
as one plaintiff already in the case has standing. 1 9 Thus, it makes no
sense to require a proposed plaintiff-intervenor to demonstrate a
constitutionally mandated interest that is equivalent to the interest
required of the first plaintiff that invoked the court's jurisdiction.
Likewise, it is just odd that some courts have required a showing of
standing by a proposed defendant-intervenor in order to gain entry into a
lawsuit. 220 As at least one court has wondered aloud, why should any
is directed at parties seeking to
defendant be subject to a doctrine that
22
commence litigation, i.e., plaintiffs? '
Of course, one of the reasons a party seeks to intervene as of right
in a district court proceeding-as opposed to merely participating as
amicus curiae-is that Rule 24(a) grants "party" status to the litigation,
including the right to appeal an unfavorable decision. 222 The Supreme
Court has held that any party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a court
of appeals must demonstrate standing in the higher court. 223 Thus, it
could be argued that a proposed intervenor who may wish to seek an
appeal at some point should first be required to demonstrate independent
standing in the lower court action. But it would be speculative of the
outcome to require such of a proposed-intervenor, especially where the
same demonstration of standing is not required of an existing co-plaintiff
in the district court.224 Moreover, the nature of the intervenor's interest
could change significantly during the lower court action, or as a result of
an adverse decision by the district court.

219. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); Am. Soc'y for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
220. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
221. See, e.g., Roeder, 333 F.3d at 233.
222. See Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cit. 2008). "The function
of an amicus curiae[, or friend of the court,] is to [bring] to the court's attention ...law[,] facts or
circumstances in a matter [before the court that could] otherwise escape [the court's] consideration."
4 AM. JUR. 2D Amicus Curiae § 6 (2007) (emphasis added). An amicus curiae is not a party to the
litigation. Id.
223. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1986).
224. See Watt, 454 U.S. at 160.
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2. Factor 2: Redressability
As a practical matter, the lower court must be in a position to both
consider the proposed-intervenor's interest, as well as to address it in
fashioning a remedy in the case. "The interest requirement [should be
defined, at minimum,] to ensure that the court is not bogged down with
unnecessary intermeddlers who bring nothing to the litigation, '' 225 or at
least who bring nothing that the court is in a position to address given
the context of the litigation. Thus, while an absentee party who might
have a breach of contract claim against Mr. X might have an interest in
making sure that X does not lose all of his money as a result of an
unrelated tort suit between Plaintiff Y and Defendant X, the court in the
Y-X suit certainly is not in a position to hear the absentee parties'
concerns. It is simply not relevant to the issues before the court in the
tort litigation. As one court best put it:
The Court does not propose that our hearing and consideration of
the limited issues above stated shall be bogged down by arguments on
various motions for leave to intervene which have been submitted, and
by oral arguments and briefs on behalf of the numerous would-be
intervenors. We have decided to deny all the pending motions for leave
to intervene, and an alternative motion ...for leave to appear as
amicus curiae and to be heard orally and by brief is also denied.
3. Factor 3: Fairness and Efficiency
Finally, a court's resolution of the absentee's interest in the case
should assist in avoiding future litigation between the parties. The focus
of the Federal Rules is, plain and simple, on fairness to the parties and to
judicial economy. Thus, "[t]he purpose of intervention is to expedite
litigation by disposing of a whole controversy among individuals and/or
entities involved in the same cause of action and to avoid multiplicity of
actions. ,,227 In cases under the APA, the court should also consider
whether the role of the intervenor would impede efficient resolution of
the agency's obligation to make policy under its Congressional
mandates.

225. See Appel, supra note 3, at 280; see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th
Cir. 2004) ("Officious intermeddlers ought not be allowed to hijack litigation that the real parties in
interest can resolve to mutual benefit.").
226. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 201 F.2d 334, 342 (1st Cir.
1953).
227.

Serio v. Equitable Life Assurance, 540 N.E.2d 800, 802 (I1. App. Ct. 1989).
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B. The Interests at Stake in APA Cases Do Not Warrant DefendantIntervention Under Rule 24(a) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
Even setting aside the real-world impact intervention can have on
the efficiency of the administrative process discussed in Part III,
defendant-intervention in judicial proceedings under the APA is also
problematic under the Federal Rules. As a practical matter, the proposed
intervenor's "interest" in a judicial review proceeding is: (1) not in an
individual legal "right," (2) that can be considered and addressed by the
court, (3) in a manner that would assist in the fair and efficient use of
judicial and administrative resources.
Of the three factors set forth in Part III.A. above, the question of
whether a proposed defendant-intervenor in an APA case has a "right" at
stake in the litigation is by far the most sticky. To address this factor, it
might be helpful to first step back and consider the question in the
context of both private law and other public law cases. The private law
case is easy. In most instances, a proposed intervenor is likely to have a
property or financial stake for which the applicant seeks to assert his or
her rights.228 With regard to traditional public law litigation, as a general
proposition, these cases involve civil rights disputes 229 that invoke
individual substantive rights primarily under the Constitution. 230 For
example, as Professor Appel explains, in a school desegregation case,
"[t]he remedy turns on how the school system can provide [standards
for] education to students [that] live up to the constitutional
command.,231 Given this constitutional overtone, it is easier for a
proposed intervenor seeking to represent the broad interests of students
and parents to demonstrate that a true right is at stake. Indeed, in these
cases a court is generally being asked to use its broad discretion to

228. See, e.g., LG Elecs. Inc. v. Q-Lity Computer Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 365 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(explaining that movant was entitled to intervene in patent infringement suit as of right only to
oppose patentee's motion to amend its infringement contentions to include movant's computer
products, since movant had a protectable interest which might not be adequately protected by
existing defendants who did not have the same knowledge as movant concerning design of movant's
products); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 110 F.R.D. 272, 273-74
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (explaining that the interest of limited partners, who invested over one million
dollars into partnership for purpose of developing property, which was now subject of foreclosure
action, had direct and substantial interest to warrant intervention as of right).
229. See Appel, supra note 3, at 222.
230. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed
ConstitutionalCompromise on Federalism and IndividualRights, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 851, 878
(2006) (stating that "[t]he civil rights movement solidified the transformation in constitutional
approaches to the preservation of liberty: from relying on the structural provisions of the
Constitution to using the courts to enforce substantive individual rights").
231. Appel, supra note 3, at 235-36.
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develop remedies that can impact the lives of numerous individuals,
including the intervenors.232
In APA rulemaking review cases, however, what is at issue is the
legality of a rulemaking that was promulgated with the intent of meeting
the agency's broad statutory mandate to regulate private conduct for the
public good. To succeed on a Rule 24(a) motion in one of these cases, a
proposed defendant-intervenor would need to establish that the
underlying statute, or the agency's challenged rule, granted him or her a
specific legal right.233 Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has made it
increasingly difficult for a party to assert a private right of action under a
federal statute.234 The Court requires the party asserting the right to
identify "textual evidence that Congress intended to [provide] a private
remedy., 235 The Supreme Court has specifically said it is "especially
reluctant to imply [private rights] under statutes [creating] duties on the
part of persons for the benefit of the public at large. 2 36 Regarding the
authority of an agency to bestow individual rights, the Supreme Court
similarly casts serious doubt on that possibility in Alexander v.
Sandova1937 when it held that agency regulations could not establish a
private right of action by regulation.2 38
Even if a proposed defendant-intervenor could establish a "right"
stemming from the agency's rulemaking, the court in a judicial review
proceeding is precluded from giving it consideration. In addition to the
requirement discussed in Part III that review of the agency action be
limited to the administrative record, the Supreme Court has stated that
the limited purpose of these proceedings is to:
"consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of

232. See id at 236.
233.
234.

See FED. R. CIV.P. 24(a)(1).
See Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal

Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 845-46 (2002).
235. Id. at 846.
236. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 n.13 (1979).
237. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
238. Id. at 291; see also Bradford C. Mank, Can Administrative Regulations Interpret Rights
Enforceable Under Section 1983?: Why Chevron Deference Survives Sandoval and Gonzaga, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 843, 847 (2005). Even if an agency has the authority to create an enforceable
individual right, its intent to do so must be clear and unambiguous. See id As one scholar noted, an
agency's regulation creating such a right would need to meet "the Supreme Court's three-prong
Blessing test." Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice? FederalAgencies and the
Creationof Individual Rights, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 613, 642. In Blessing v. Freestone,the Court held,
among other things, that in creating a federal right, "the statute [here, the regulation] must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
340-41 (1997).
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judgment."... Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
to a difference in view or the product of agency
be ascribed
239
expertise.
In performing this task, a court "is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency., 240 Instead, the Court has "long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer., 24' Thus,
even if a reviewing court was to disagree with the treatment of a
proposed intervenor's interest by the agency, "[i]f [the agency's] choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, [a court] should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history 2that
42
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.
In this regard, it is fair to say that the presumption that the
government cannot adequately represent a defendant-intervenor's
interest in an APA case misses the mark on the role of government in
rulemaking cases. As some have noted, "in today's complex regulatory
environent... [g]overnmental organizations represent broad interests
applicable to all citizens, and cannot effectively represent narrow and
possibly conflicting interests. 243 The nature of regulation, it is argued,
sets up a conflict "between the regulator and regulated," and the same
government defendant cannot represent this conflict. 244 This is
undoubtedly true in the administrative rulemaking process. But for
reasons just noted, once the rule goes before the court of review, the case
is no longer about interests of the regulator or the regulated; it is only

239. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1973) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
240. Id.
241. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
242. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)); see also
Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he essential

function of judicial review is a determination of (1) whether the agency acted within the scope of its
authority, (2) whether the agency complied with prescribed procedures, and (3) whether the action is
otherwise arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.").
243. Black, supra note 122, at 483.
244. Goepp, supra note 123, at 132; see also Utah Ass'n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246,
1255-56 (10th Cir. 2001).
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about whether the government has fully articulated an adequate reason,
on the record, for making its policymaking choice.245
It is, therefore, not the doctrine of parens patriae that needs to be
invoked to limit defendant-intervenor participation, but instead
principals of administrative law. The limited scope of judicial review
does not allow for a forum for individuals to assert their rights to an
agency decision. As Professor Gary Lawson has described the purpose
of judicial review:
The agency must demonstrate awareness and candor. It must indicate
that it knows that it is dealing with factual and statutory uncertainty
and that an answer is therefore not dictated by any evidentiary or
interpretive considerations. It must then identify the nonfactual and
nonstatutory considerations upon which it chooses to rely and the
reasons why it selected those considerations rather than others. The

agency should prevail, on this model, so long as [the record discloses]
those considerations and the reasons that led to them [and that those
considerations and
reasons] bear some plausible relation to the
246
agency's mission.
A court can perform this function and conclude whether the agency
has satisfied its obligation regardless of whether or not an intervenor is
present in the litigation. More importantly, the court is simply not
allowed to revisit the intervenor's interest beyond
what is already set
2 47
forth in the rulemaking record before the court.
Finally, the presence of an intervenor in these cases does nothing to
promote judicial or administrative efficiency. Recall that the purpose
behind intervention is, in part, to minimize the need for multiple judicial
proceedings.24 8 The nature of the intervenor's interest in an APA caseto support the agency rulemaking-is generally not one that could be
unilaterally attacked (or protected) in an independent action outside of
the judicial review proceeding. Moreover, given the court's limited
discretion regarding the remedy in these cases-whether to remand an
agency rule, set it aside, or both 249 -it is also unlikely that a decision
would generate additional litigation related to an intervenor's interests.
The status of the rulemaking would guide the intervenor's action at that
245. See Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1573-74 (10th Cir. 1994).
246. Lawson, supranote 173, at 324-25 (third emphasis added).
247. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
248. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Richard D. Freer, Rethinking
Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U L. REV. 1061, 1061
(1985) ("There is a strong movement in federal court litigation toward 'packaging' all aspects of a
controversy into a single lawsuit." (footnote omitted)); Jenkins, supra note 2, at 277.
249. See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
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point; at least until subsequent agency action occurs. There is, in short,
no need to bring the intervenor into the case to aid the policymaking
process.
C. Courts Have Acknowledged the Concern over Third-Party
Involvement in APA Cases Under Rule 19
It has been observed that "Rule 19(a)(2)(i), dealing with joinder of
persons needed for a just adjudication, and Rule 23(b)(1)(B), dealing
with class actions, as well as the new Rule 24(a)(2), contain substantially
similar language establishing as a criterion the practical effect which the
action in question will have on the absent parties. ' '250 Indeed, the drafters
of both rules viewed them as counterparts: "Rule 19 addresse[d]
concerns of an existing party to a lawsuit, [whereas] Rule 24(a) [was]
suited to protect one who is not yet a party to the [action]. 25 1 In either
case, there are similar interests at stake that strongly support inclusion of
a non-party in the litigation.2 52
Notably, in the context of APA judicial review proceedings, courts
have repeatedly found that joinder of interested parties into the case is
not required-invoking what has been labeled the "public interest
exception. 253 This exception provides that when litigation seeks
vindication of a public right, third persons who could be adversely
affected by a decision favorable to the plaintiff are not indispensable
parties. 254" While "[t]he exact contours of the public interest exception
have not been defined[,]" the exception generally applies where "what is
at stake are essentially issues of public concern and the nature of the case
would require joinder of a large number of persons., 255 Thus, according
250. Howard J. Alperin, Construction of FederalCivil Procedure Rule 24(a)(2), as amended in
1966, Insofar as Dealing with Prerequisitesof Intervention as a Matter ofRight, 5 A.L.R. Fed. 518,
§ 3 (1970); see also Katherine Florey, Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the

Evolution of Rule 19, 58 UCLA L. REv. 667, 718 n.319 (2011) (explaining that the language in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)).
251. Robert K.G. Bollich, Comment, Through an "'Intervention," the Court of Federal Claims
Expresses Itself as the People's Courtof Our Nation, 51 S.TEX. L. REv. 147, 154 (2009).
252. Id. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at ProceduralDiscretion, 28

CARDozo L. REv. 1961, 1970 (2007) ("Both Rules use similar open-ended language, such as
"interest" and "impair or impede," to define the circumstances under which an absentee should be
joined (Rule 19(a)) or has a right to intervene in the lawsuit (Rule 24(a)(2))."); Tobias, supra note
39, at 770 n. 124 ("It is helpful to view the 1966 party joinder amendments as a package of different
tools designed to solve similar problems."). Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest greater
harmonization of Rule 19 and Rule 24 jurisprudence; see also Juliet Johnson Karastelev, On the
Outside Seeking in:Must Intervenors Demonstrate Standing to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455,
472-73 (2002).

253.

See Tobias, supra note 81, at 321.

254.

See id.

255.

Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
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to the Eleventh Circuit, "when litigation seeks vindication of a public
right, third persons who could be adversely affected by a decision
favorable to the plaintiff do not thereby become indispensable
parties. ,,256
It has been noted that the Federal Rules themselves compel the
reading of a public rights exception into Rule 19 as much as they are
required to "be 'construed [in a manner] to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.' ''257 Surely, if justice cannot
be done if public interest litigation is hampered by the requirement of
joinder,258 justice is equally impaired when Rule 24 intervention
diminishes the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative process,
"[i]n sum, then, the
as envisioned by the APA. As one court observed, 259
public interest exception ... just makes good sense.,
V.

RETHINKING INTERVENTION IN RULEMAKING CASES

In Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp.,26° the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals announced the sweeping proposition that, in reviewing
agency actions under the APA, lower courts must refrain from using
summary judgment and other procedural mechanisms available under the
Federal Rules. 26' The court was dismayed that the lower court had
APA.262
abandoned the narrow scope of judicial review required by the
Instead of focusing its inquiry to the administrative record, the lower
court had instead relied on the arguments of counsel in the summary
judgment proceeding to affirm the agency's action.2 63 The Tenth Circuit
felt compelled to "chastise[] the lower court's use of 'illicit' procedures
and emphasized the need to examine the actual administrative record and
avoid reliance on extra-record information. 2 4 Moreover, the court
v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 276 (D.D.C. 1985).
256. Jeffries v. Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (1 th Cir. 1982).
257. Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Ws. L. REV. 415, 457 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
1).
258.

Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 325.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1579-80.
Id.at 1580.
Id.at 1579-80.

264. Sam Kalen, Federal Administrative Procedure Act Claims: The Tenth Circuit and the
Wyoming District Court Should Fix the Confusion Attendant with Local Rule 83.7.2, 11 WYO. L.
REV. 513, 521 (2011); see also Staso v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1337 (D. Kan. 2008).
The Staso court held:

It is clear from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Olenhouse... , however, that the use of
summary judgment is prohibited in administrative appeals such as this case... [because]
the summary judgment procedure improperly allows the moving party ... to define the
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announced a striking new rule for the circuit: in APA proceedings, lower
courts should "function[] like an appellant court and must [consider]
these cases ... in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.265
Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., provides a good look at the
trouble associated with a court over-applying the more familiar
adversarial processes embodied in the Federal Rules to the review of an
agency's informal rulemakings. In this Article, I have sought to make a
similar case regarding application of Rule 24(a). In this final Part, I
provide a few proposals to amend the APA, the Federal Rules, or both to
address non-party involvement in informal rulemaking cases. While my
principle suggestion is to eliminate the application of Rule 24(a) to APA
rulemaking cases, I do so in realization that there are circumstances that
can arise within these proceedings that call for participation of nonparties. Thus, I would allow limited, permissible intervention under Rule
24(b) when a court goes outside of the administrative record during its
consideration of interim or permanent relief and where a third-party has
a legitimate equitable claim of reliance on the agency's informal action.
Likewise, in cases where the party seeking judicial review reaches a
settlement with the government agency, I would invite broader
participation, in the form of public comment, to help ensure that
resolution of the case is in the public interest.
A.

EliminateIntervention of Right in APA Informal Rulemaking Cases

There is no need for an intervention of right practice in APA cases.
As already noted, the APA provides for the right to judicial review to
any person adversely affected by the agency's action. 266 For this reason,
any affected party can become a plaintiff in a case seeking judicial
review as long as he or she does so within the limitations period, if any,
issues on appeal and erroneously invites the court to rely on evidence outside the
administrative record.
Staso, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
265. Kalen, supranote 264, at 521. According to the court, in APA proceedings:
A district court is not exclusively a trial court. In addition to its nisi prius functions, it
must sometimes act as an appellate court. Reviews of agency action in the district courts
must be processed as appeals. In such circumstances the district court should govem
itself by referring to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Motions to affirm and
motions for summary judgment are conceptually incompatible with the very nature and
purpose of an appeal.
Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1580. Olenhouse has certainly changed the way these cases are heard in lower
courts within the circuit. Both U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming have
amended their local rules to revise the procedural posture of APA cases. D.C. COLo. L.A.P.R.
10.2(C); D.C. Wyo. L.C.R. 83.7.2(b).
266. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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provided by Congress.267 The only real concern is where a party seeks to
join a judicial review late in the court proceedings and threatens to cause
delay in the outcome. 268 This problem, however, could be handled in a
more efficient and equitable manner than the denial of a Rule 24(a)
motion. For instance, the APA or Federal Rules could place time limits
on the right to join existing administrative review proceedings, as is the
case under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 269 Latecomers
could then choose to file a new complaint seeking judicial review, and
the court could be left to determine how to coordinate the two actions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42.270
With regard to the substantive review of an agency rulemaking, for
reasons discussed in great depth in Parts II and III of this Article, there is
also just no justifiable role for defendant-intervenors in these cases. To
ensure speedy resolution of public policy matters before administrative
agencies, the APA or Federal Rules should be amended to provide a
"public interest" exception to both Rule 19 and 24.
Of course, there will be those who argue that defendant-intervenors
can improve public policy by bringing to the table arguments in support
of a rule that were not fully considered by the agency during the
administrative process. Indeed, critics of the administrative process have
rightfully complained that participation in traditional agency "noticeand-comment rulemaking suffers from problems of quality."27 ' But it
makes little sense to revert to an adversarial judicial process as a means
of addressing the inadequacy of the administrative process. Instead, as I
have argued elsewhere, we need to improve the quality of public
267.

See FED. R. CIv. P. 24.

268. See Appel, supra note 3, at 260.
269. FED. R. APP. P. 15(d). The Rule states:
Unless a statute provides another method, a person who wants to intervene in a
proceeding under this rule must file a motion for leave to intervene with the circuit clerk
and serve a copy on all parties. The motion-or other notice of intervention authorized
by statute-must be filed within 30 days after the petition for review is filed and must
contain a concise statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds for
intervention.
Id. This rule does not explicitly set forth any specific requirements on a party seeking to intervene
other than that it must explain its interest in the proceeding and grounds for intervention. Id. And
although the rule uses the term "intervene," courts have not scrutinized proposed-intervenors in the
same manner as a Rule 24(a) motion. Instead, it is enough for the movant to explain how he or she
has been affected by the agency's action. See, e.g., Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794
F.2d 737, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (allowing intervention because petitioners were "directly affected
by" application of agency policy).
270. FED. R. CIrv. P. 42(a) states: "If actions before the court involve a common question of law
or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2)
consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay."
271. See, e.g., Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, A Complex(ity) Strategy for Breaking the
Logjam, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 170, 177 (2008).
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participation in the first instance, preferably in the form of a more
discursive agency process. 272
B. PermissiveIntervention to Prevent Third-PartyInequities
In the course of civil litigation, a federal court is often asked to
resolve matters related to interim or permanent relief in addition to
ruling on the merits of the underlying claim(s). The same can be true in
an action to review agency action under the APA. For instance, a
plaintiff in an APA rulemaking case may seek a preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to enjoin an
agency from implementing its rules pending a final decision by the
reviewing court. 273 In considering whether to grant such interim relief,
the court will consider several factors, including: (1) the likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) the likelihood that the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the event that injunctive relief is not granted; (3) the
balance of equities between the parties; and (4) whether an injunction is
in the public interest. 274 It is not unusual, therefore, for the court to turn
to evidence from outside of the administrative record in considering the
equities in a decision to grant or deny relief275
Similarly, while Section 706 of the APA purports to require that a
court "set aside" an unlawful agency action,276 courts have recognized
that in some cases, equitable consideration might require it to keep an
agency's decision in place while the agency is given a chance to
reconsider the rule.277 Courts have identified the following factors
controlling the equitable decision to vacate or retain the defective rule
during remand: "1) the purposes of the substantive statute under which
the agency was acting; 2) the consequences of invalidating or enjoining
the agency action; 3) the potential prejudice to those who will be
affected by maintaining the status quo; and 4) 'the magnitude of

272.

Michael Ray Harris, Environmental Deliberative Democracy and the Search for

Administrative Legitimacy: A Legal Positivism Approach, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 373-74

(2011).
273. See FED. R. CrV. P. 65(a). "The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to
the adverse party." Id.
274. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir.
2009).
275.

See id.

276. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). "Ordinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance
with the APA, the regulation is invalid." Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405
(9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, "vacatur of an unlawful agency rule normally accompanies a remand."
Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep't of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004).
277. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 236 (5th Cir. 1989); W. Oil & Gas
Assoc. v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980).
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administrative error and how extensive and substantive [the error]
was.'"278 Again, in these narrow cases where a court is asked to consider
not setting aside the agency decision, a review outside of the record to
examine the equitable considerations may be required.
In these two circumstances, it is plausible that a non-party could
demonstrate an adequate legal interest in the relief being considered by
the court. Moreover, unlike with regard to the underlying review of the
agency action, because of the potential scope of discretion in deciding to
grant the requested relief, the court would have the ability to both
consider the third-party interest and, if appropriate, redress it. For
example, courts have recognized that government regulations applicable
to third parties are often put in place to protect the health and safety of
specific classes of persons that would be at jeopardy in the event of a
vacature (or injunction).279 In such a case, those in the protected class
would meet the three-factor test proposed in Part IV for intervention.
To provide for meaningful participation by a third-party in these
limited circumstances, the APA should provide for the right to seek
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).280 In doing so, the court would
not have to allow the intervenor to enter into the proceeding as a full
party with all rights to participate in the action.281 Thus, the court would
be able to allow the intervenor to make his or her equitable arguments
regarding interim or permanent relief while maintaining a limited
proceeding to review the agency action consistent with the APA.
C. Requiring Use of Consent Decrees with
Public Comment to Settle APA Rulemaking Actions
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[r]egulatory agencies
do not establish rules of conduct to last forever." 282 Agency
policymaking is, in fact, often subject to the political changes brought
about from "the election of a new President of a different political
party., 283 "As long as the agency remains within the bounds [of its
278. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (quoting Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Babbit, 852 F.
Supp. 32, 41 (D.D.C. 1994)).
279. See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
280. "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim
or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
281. Unlike Rule 24(a), the rights of a permissive intervenor may be limited at the discretion of
the court. United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d 1240, 1306 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
282. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416
(1967).
283. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
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statutory authority], it is entitled to... [re]evaluate its priorities in light
of the philosophy of the [new] administration. '28 4
Of course, a new administration might choose to signal a change in
policy direction another way: by not adequately defending the
promulgated rules of a previous administration in an ongoing APA
case."' When this occurs, it is not wholly unfair to want those who
would defend a rule that benefits their interest to be given the right to
intervene to do so. But there are two arguments against allowing
intervention of right where it can be argued that the government is not
adequately defending its own administrative rulemaking. First, as long as
the government is continuing to participate in the litigation as a
defendant, the argument that it is doing a poor or inadequate job is
somewhat subjective. Certainly, any party who thinks the government
should be more rigorous in its efforts, or who believes its attorneys could
do a better job, would be inclined to demand intervention. Second, as
long as the case is continuing, the court is still obligated to uphold the
rule unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the decision is unreasonable
in light of the existing administrative record. While this might not be the
most reliable safeguard, it is the one required by the APA. 286
On the other hand, when the government chooses not to defend the
rulemaking by settling with the plaintiff, no check on the process exists
at all. In such a case, there is the possibility that the government could
make promises to the plaintiff to take policy in a different direction that
would undermine Congress's intent, or it could voluntarily vacate rules
without following the procedures of the APA. In this situation, the
government should be required to settle only in the context of a courtauthorized consent decree that allows for public comment regarding
whether the settlement is in the public interest.

29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284. Id.
285. Government decisions to not defend its regulations are rare, but not uncommon. Professor
Jack M. Beermann suggests that an incoming administration may not, due to politics,
"enthusiastically defend [a challenged] rule, and the rule might be invalidated or limited when a
better defense may have vindicated the rule." Jack M. Beermann, PresidentialPower in Transitions,
83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 959 (2003); see also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 471-72 (1989) (suggesting that the 1970

amendments to the Clean Air Act were intended to provide procedural protection to the President
against agency drift). For examples of cases where the Executive Branch decided not to defend a
challenged rule or law, see Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 22, 1996).
286. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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Unlike typical settlement agreements, a consent decree carries "the
earmarks of [a] judicial order[] because [it is] (1) entered by a court, (2)
enforceable by the court through the use of a contempt of court citation,
and (3) potentially modifiable by the court, even over the objection of a
party to the agreement., 287 Consent decrees in the public interest are
often made subject to public comment.288 In suits involving the public
interest, the court's role is more searching than in typical litigation
between private parties.2 89 The adequacy and reasonableness of a
consent decree involves consideration of a number of factors, including
"whether the decree is technically adequate[,] ... reflects the relative
strength[s] or weaknesses of the government's case[,] ... is in the public
interest[,] and [advances] the objectives of the [applicable statute]. 9 0
Moreover, to measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily look
to the negotiation process and attempt to "gauge its candor, openness,
and bargaining balance., 291 Thus, the consent decree process would
provide a better check to ensure that valid rulemakings intended to carry
out congressional mandates in the public interest are not improperly
vacated by the agency.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The political reality of today is that more often than not, we depend
on administrative processes to make the value-laden policy decisions
that bear on everyday American life. Indeed, "[a]nyone concerned with
the state of our democracy and the performance of our government must
be concerned with ...rulemaking. We can [certainly] be no less
demanding about this process than we are about any other, and certainly
no less aware. 2 92 Thus, for decades legal scholars have been correct to
scrutinize the role of the courts in this process. Judicial review can, and
most likely does, impose a barrier to the speedy promulgation and
implementation of agency rules. But it is time to question whether the
focus should only be on the "standard of review" that courts utilize in
these cases. The scope of the court's review may only be part of the
problem. It is time that we also evaluate whether the procedures courts
287. John R. Thomas, Note, United States v. Fisher: "Posner's Dilemma" and the Uncertain
Triumph of Outcome Over Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 427,434 (1991).
288. See, e.g.,
Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553, 561 (D. Utah 1992).
289. United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (D. Colo. 1994).
290. Id.
291. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 567 n.13 (quoting United States v. Cannons Eng'g
Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 278 (2d ed. 1999).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4

928

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:879

use today to resolve these cases has restored the adversarial process of
public policymaking we long ago sought to abandon for the sake of
efficiency. And if so, we can correct it by reducing the role of
intervenors who often seek only to remake their cases for particular
agency rules in the courtroom.
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